

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2045515	HK0388045442	Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited	Asia	Hong Kong	29 April 2026	Annual	Against	2b	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
2069124	HK0000069689	AIA Group Limited	Asia	Hong Kong	22 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2069737	HK0066009694	MTR Corporation Limited	Asia	Hong Kong	27 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2071848	HK1208013172	MMG Limited	Asia	Hong Kong	28 May 2026	Annual	Against	2d 2a 2e 5,7	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3] Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3] Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
2075726	HK0144000764	China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited	Asia	Hong Kong	02 June 2026	Annual	Against	3Ac 3Aa 3Ad 5A,5C	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
2074597	HK0012000102	Henderson Land Development Company Limited	Asia	Hong Kong	02 June 2026	Annual	Against	3.1,3.2 3.4 3.3 5B,5C	Concern that the Chair and CEO role are combined, which can lead to a lack of independent oversight of management, particularly when insufficiently balanced by the presence of a Lead Independent Director with adequate powers to ensure the board may act independently of the Chair in certain circumstances.[IndividualDirector2] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
2071863	US8923301019	Toyota Industries Corp.	Asia	Japan	12 May 2026	Special	All For				1
2082436	JP3982200002	Rorze Corp.	Asia	Japan	28 May 2026	Annual	Against	2.1 2.5	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6]		1
2087062	JP3236200006	KEYENCE Corp.	Asia	Japan	12 June 2026	Annual	All For				2
2085669	JP3160400002	Eisai Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	17 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.1	Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
2085217	JP3633400001	Toyota Motor Corp.	Asia	Japan	17 June 2026	Annual	All For			1.1,1.2	1
2088159	JP3551500006	DENSO Corp.	Asia	Japan	18 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.1,1.2	Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
2088144	JP3206000006	Kakaku.com, Inc.	Asia	Japan	18 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2088547	JP3283460008	Koei Tecmo Holdings Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	18 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.7 3 2.2,2.3,2.6 4	Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2089090	JP3885400006	MISUMI Group, Inc.	Asia	Japan	18 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2088147	JP3899800001	Mitsubishi Motors Corp.	Asia	Japan	18 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.8 2.10,2.12	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2]		1
2087058	JP3102000001	Aisin Corp.	Asia	Japan	19 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.1	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
2089094	JP3942400007	Astellas Pharma, Inc.	Asia	Japan	19 June 2026	Annual	All For				2
2086166	JP3783600004	East Japan Railway Co.	Asia	Japan	19 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.1,2.2	Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
2086564	JP3143600009	ITOCHU Corp.	Asia	Japan	19 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2087056	JP3183200009	Japan Exchange Group, Inc.	Asia	Japan	19 June 2026	Annual	All For				2
2089683	JP3879250003	MARUWA CO., LTD.	Asia	Japan	19 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2089691	JP3684400009	Nitto Boseki Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	19 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.4 2.1,2.2	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
2088152	JP3778630008	Bandai Namco Holdings, Inc.	Asia	Japan	22 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.1	Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
2088158	JP3475350009	Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	22 June 2026	Annual	All For				1

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2088175	JP3165000005	Sompo Holdings, Inc.	Asia	Japan	22 June 2026	Annual	Against	3.2 3.4 3.1 4	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Shareholder proposal seeks to protect and, where appropriate, advance shareholder rights on behalf of institutional investors.[ShareholderProposal9]		1
2091263	JP3160060004	AI ROBOTICS, Inc.	Asia	Japan	23 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.1	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1]		1
2087585	JP3566800003	Central Japan Railway Co.	Asia	Japan	23 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.1,2.2 2.8	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2]		1
2089098	JP3421100003	Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	23 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.2 2.1 2.9 5	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1] Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns that the proposal introduces anti-takeover measures which may prevent an offer to acquire shares being presented to long-term shareholders.[ShareholderRights2]		1
2088550	JP3289800009	Kobe Steel, Ltd.	Asia	Japan	23 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.3 1.5,1.8 1.1	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
2088548	JP3304200003	Komatsu Ltd.	Asia	Japan	23 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.5	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2]		1
2088162	JP3903000002	Mitsubishi Materials Corp.	Asia	Japan	23 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2088564	JP3973400009	Ricoh Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	23 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2086108	JP3435000009	Sony Group Corp.	Asia	Japan	23 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2088183	JP3443600006	TAISEI Corp.	Asia	Japan	23 June 2026	Annual	Against	3.1,3.2	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
2085690	JP3104890003	TIS, Inc. (Japan)	Asia	Japan	23 June 2026	Annual	Against	3.8 3.1,3.2	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
2088225	JP3571400005	Tokyo Electron Ltd.	Asia	Japan	23 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.1	Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
2089690	JP3955000009	Yokogawa Electric Corp.	Asia	Japan	23 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.1,2.2	Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
2088164	JP3111200006	Asahi Kasei Corp.	Asia	Japan	24 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2090373	JP3830000000	Brother Industries, Ltd.	Asia	Japan	24 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2089697	JP3548600000	DISCO Corp.	Asia	Japan	24 June 2026	Annual	All For				2
2089105	JP3788600009	Hitachi Ltd.	Asia	Japan	24 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2088555	JP3386030005	JFE Holdings, Inc.	Asia	Japan	24 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.1	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1]		1
2089700	JP3862400003	Makita Corp.	Asia	Japan	24 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.1	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1]		1
2088553	JP3897700005	Mitsubishi Chemical Group Corp.	Asia	Japan	24 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.1,1.4,1.5,1.7	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1]		1
2089114	JP3888300005	Mitsui Chemicals, Inc.	Asia	Japan	24 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.1,2.2 2.9	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2]		1
2087617	JP3970300004	Recruit Holdings Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	24 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2088563	JP3982800009	ROHM Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	24 June 2026	Annual	Against	3.1	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
2091217	JP3419050004	Sega Sammy Holdings, Inc.	Asia	Japan	24 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.6	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2]		1
2088551	JP3347200002	Shionogi & Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	24 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2090348	JP3436100006	SoftBank Group Corp.	Asia	Japan	24 June 2026	Annual	Against	3.1 3.6	Concern that the Chair and CEO role are combined, which can lead to a lack of independent oversight of management, particularly when insufficiently balanced by the presence of a Lead Independent Director with adequate powers to ensure the board may act independently of the Chair in certain circumstances.[IndividualDirector2] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructureUS2] Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests [BoardStructureGL2] Concerns that a conflict of interest may exist which is materially reducing the value of the proposal to the benefit of the company.[IndividualDirector4]		1
2088566	JP3814800003	Subaru Corp.	Asia	Japan	24 June 2026	Annual	All For				1

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2088558	JP3401400001	Sumitomo Chemical Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	24 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.1,2.2	Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
2088172	JP3621000003	Toray Industries, Inc.	Asia	Japan	24 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.1,2.2	Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
2087602	JP3634200004	Toyoda Gosei Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	24 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.1,2.2	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1]		1
2089109	JP3126400005	Alps Alpine Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	25 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2089713	JP3802400006	FANUC Corp.	Asia	Japan	25 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2091224	JP3799000009	HIROSE ELECTRIC CO., LTD.	Asia	Japan	25 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.8 2.1	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1]		1
2091876	JP3292200007	JTEKT Corp.	Asia	Japan	25 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.1 2.2	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5]		1
2093440	JP3236330001	Kioxia Holdings Corp.	Asia	Japan	25 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.1,2.2 8	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2089717	JP3270000007	Kurita Water Industries Ltd.	Asia	Japan	25 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2092273	JP3249600002	Kyocera Corp.	Asia	Japan	25 June 2026	Annual	Against	3.1,3.3 10,11,12	Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
2091226	JP3720800006	NSK Ltd.	Asia	Japan	25 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.1 1.7	Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2]		1
2092598	JP3173400007	OBIC Co. Ltd.	Asia	Japan	25 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.1,2.2,2.7	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2]		2
2091242	JP3343200006	Sanrio Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	25 June 2026	Annual	Against	3 1.1	Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		2
2087596	JP3414750004	Seiko Epson Corp.	Asia	Japan	25 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2087063	JP3357200009	Shimadzu Corp.	Asia	Japan	25 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.1,2.2	Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
2089728	JP3399400005	Stanley Electric Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	25 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.1 1.5	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1] Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6]		1
2089714	JP3402600005	Sumitomo Metal Mining Co. Ltd.	Asia	Japan	25 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.1,2.2	Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
2088171	JP3397200001	Suzuki Motor Corp.	Asia	Japan	25 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.1	Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
2089108	JP3595200001	Tosoh Corp.	Asia	Japan	25 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.2,1.5,1.6,1.8 1.1	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
2089742	JP3493800001	Dai Nippon Printing Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	26 June 2026	Annual	Against	3.1 3.9	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2]		1
2089123	JP3486800000	Daito Trust Construction Co. Ltd.	Asia	Japan	26 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2088591	JP3811000003	Fujikura Ltd.	Asia	Japan	26 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2091442	JP3826800009	Furukawa Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	26 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.1	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
2090366	JP3837800006	HOYA Corp.	Asia	Japan	26 June 2026	Annual	All For				3

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2093248	JP3230600003	Kandenko Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	26 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.8 2.1 2.2	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
2093244	JP3435750009	M3, Inc.	Asia	Japan	26 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2089731	JP3900000005	Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.	Asia	Japan	26 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.1,2.2 2.5,2.6	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2]		1
2090363	JP3902900004	Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Inc.	Asia	Japan	26 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.3,2.7	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2]	2.11,2.12	1
2091889	JP3756600007	Nintendo Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	26 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.1	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
2090378	JP3717600005	Nippon Shinyaku Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	26 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.1,2.2	Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
2089748	JP3753400005	NOF Corp.	Asia	Japan	26 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.5 2.1,2.2	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
2089735	JP3198900007	Oriental Land Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	26 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.6	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2]		1
2092610	JP3967170006	RAKUS Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	26 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.4 2.5 2.1	Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
2091892	JP3326410002	Sankyo Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	26 June 2026	Annual	Against	3.1	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2]		1
2092880	JP3436120004	SBI Holdings, Inc.	Asia	Japan	26 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.1 1.12,1.13,1.14,1.15 1.1	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1]		1
2090379	JP3494600004	SCREEN Holdings Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	26 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.1,2.2	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
2089736	JP3371200001	Shin-Etsu Chemical Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	26 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2089767	JP3162600005	SMC Corp. (Japan)	Asia	Japan	26 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2090370	JP3351100007	Sysmex Corp.	Asia	Japan	26 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.1,2.2	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1]		1
2089744	JP3452000007	Taiyo Yuden Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	26 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.4	Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6]		1
2088569	JP3573000001	Tokyo Gas Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	26 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2094376	JP3548610009	DeNA Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	27 June 2026	Annual	Against	2.1,2.2	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
2093322	JP3783420007	Hikari Tsushin, Inc.	Asia	Japan	27 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.1,1.2	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2]		1
2090688	JP3695200000	NGK Corp.	Asia	Japan	29 June 2026	Annual	Against	3 2.1,2.2	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
2087622	JP3910660004	Tokio Marine Holdings, Inc.	Asia	Japan	29 June 2026	Annual	Against	4.6 4.1,4.2,5.3	EOS override. Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2094654	JP3399310006	ZOZO, Inc.	Asia	Japan	29 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.1	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2]		1
2091900	JP3663900003	Sojitz Corp.	Asia	Japan	30 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.1,1.2	Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
2056061	SG1M51904654	CapitaLand Integrated Commercial Trust	Asia	Singapore	22 April 2026	Annual	All For				1
2062099	SG1M77906915	CapitaLand Ascendas REIT	Asia	Singapore	24 April 2026	Annual	All For				1

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2088546	SG1M51904654	CapitaLand Integrated Commercial Trust	Asia	Singapore	10 June 2026	Extraordinary Shareholders	All For				1
2047832	KR7052690005	KEPCO Engineering & Construction Co., Inc.	Asia	South Korea	19 May 2026	Special	All For				1
2067844	KR7052690005	KEPCO Engineering & Construction Co., Inc.	Asia	South Korea	28 May 2026	Special	All For				1
2081457	TW0002330008	Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., Ltd.	Asia	Taiwan	04 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2038303	AU000000SCG8	Scentre Group	Australia & New Zealand	Australia	22 April 2026	Annual	All For				1
2057624	BMG0450A1053	Arch Capital Group Ltd.	Emerging Markets	Bermuda	05 May 2026	Annual	Against	1a	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5]		2
2065669	BMG359472021	FLEX LNG Ltd.	Emerging Markets	Bermuda	05 May 2026	Annual	Against	6	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
2059664	BMG7738W1064	SFL Corporation Ltd.	Emerging Markets	Bermuda	11 May 2026	Annual	Against	4 12	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureUS3] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns that the proposal introduces anti-takeover measures which may prevent an offer to acquire shares being presented to long-term shareholders.[ShareholderRights2]		1
2067130	BMG3223R1088	Everest Group, Ltd.	Emerging Markets	Bermuda	13 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.1	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
2085191	BMG812761002	Signet Jewelers Limited	Emerging Markets	Bermuda	26 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2065236	KYG217651051	CK Hutchison Holdings Limited	Emerging Markets	Cayman Islands	27 April 2026	Extraordinary Shareholders	All For				1
2070293	KYG217651051	CK Hutchison Holdings Limited	Emerging Markets	Cayman Islands	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	3d	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2]		1
2067756	KYG687071012	PagSeguro Digital Ltd.	Emerging Markets	Cayman Islands	27 May 2026	Annual	Against	1a	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructureUS2] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureUS3] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2067998	KYG9515T1085	Weibo Corporation	Emerging Markets	Cayman Islands	27 May 2026	Annual	Against	1	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructureUS2] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2086167	KYG6427A1022	NetEase, Inc.	Emerging Markets	Cayman Islands	23 June 2026	Annual	Against	1b,1d,1e 3 2 5a,5b	Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns that the proposal will introduce or perpetuate diminished minority shareholder rights.[ShareholderRights3]		1
2085867	KYG6427A1022	NetEase, Inc.	Emerging Markets	Cayman Islands	23 June 2026	Annual	Against	5a,5b 1b,1d,1e 3 2	Concerns that the proposal will introduce or perpetuate diminished minority shareholder rights.[ShareholderRights3] Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2090197	KYG9066F1019	Trip.com Group Limited	Emerging Markets	Cayman Islands	30 June 2026	Annual	Against	1	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
2089330	KYG9066F1019	Trip.com Group Limited	Emerging Markets	Cayman Islands	30 June 2026	Annual	Against	1	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
2070292	CNE100006V65	China Tower Corporation Limited	Emerging Markets	China	15 May 2026	Annual	Against	5	Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
2078830	CNE1000003K3	Jiangxi Copper Company Limited	Emerging Markets	China	05 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2088757	CNE100006V65	China Tower Corporation Limited	Emerging Markets	China	16 June 2026	Extraordinary Shareholders	Against	1	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1]Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2]		1
2046051	AN8068571086	SLB Limited	Emerging Markets	Curacao	08 April 2026	Annual	Against	1.3 1.8	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
2075583	INE009A01021	Infosys Limited	Emerging Markets	India	24 May 2026	Special	All For				1
2092834	INE009A01021	Infosys Limited	Emerging Markets	India	23 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2074433	IL0002730112	NICE Ltd. (Israel)	Emerging Markets	Israel	09 June 2026	Special	All For				1
2078838	MHY410531021	International Seaways, Inc.	Emerging Markets	Marshall Isl	08 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2081872	MHY2065G1219	DHT Holdings, Inc.	Emerging Markets	Marshall Isl	18 June 2026	Annual	Against	1	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5]		1
2055112	MX01VIOC0006	Vista Energy SAB de CV	Emerging Markets	Mexico	28 April 2026	Annual	All For				1
2081916	PLKGHM000017	KGHM Polska Miedz SA	Emerging Markets	Poland	09 June 2026	Annual	Against	14 11f	Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2059832	ZAE000013181	Valterra Platinum Ltd.	Emerging Markets	South Africa	08 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2067438	ZAE000018123	Gold Fields Ltd.	Emerging Markets	South Africa	21 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2062182	AT0000606306	Raiffeisen Bank International AG	Europe	Austria	09 April 2026	Annual	Against	6.1.6.2.6.3	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6]		1

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2041333	AT0000652011	Erste Group Bank AG	Europe	Austria	17 April 2026	Annual	All For				1
2041336	AT0000746409	VERBUND AG	Europe	Austria	21 April 2026	Annual	All For				2
2061704	BE0003739530	UCB SA	Europe	Belgium	30 April 2026	Annual/Special	Against	8.2 5	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2035333	BE0974320526	Umicore SA	Europe	Belgium	30 April 2026	Annual/Special	Against	A.8.1 A.2	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2067344	BE0003797140	Groupe Bruxelles Lambert SA	Europe	Belgium	07 May 2026	Annual	Against	5.2 6,7.2	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2067353	BE0003797140	Groupe Bruxelles Lambert SA	Europe	Belgium	07 May 2026	Extraordinary Shareholders	All For				1
2037704	BE0003565737	KBC Group NV	Europe	Belgium	07 May 2026	Annual	Against	10.1,10.3 7	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2037718	BE0003717312	Sofina SA	Europe	Belgium	13 May 2026	Annual	Against	4.5 4.6 2.2	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2041849	BE0003822393	Elia Group SA/NV	Europe	Belgium	19 May 2026	Annual	Against	16 11,12,13,14,21,22 18 4,5	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns relating to the attendance of a director, which appears to be lower than 75% of the relevant board and committee meetings expected annually without clear justification of their absence.[BoardStructure2] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
2070583	BE0003822393	Elia Group SA/NV	Europe	Belgium	19 May 2026	Extraordinary Shareholders	All For				2
2038706	DK0061539921	Vestas Wind Systems A/S	Europe	Denmark	08 April 2026	Annual	Abstain	6a	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		2
2039860	DK0060094928	Orsted A/S	Europe	Denmark	09 April 2026	Annual	Against	3	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]	8.2	2
2040248	DK0063855168	ROCKWOOL A/S	Europe	Denmark	15 April 2026	Annual	Abstain Against	7.4 4	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2040304	DK0060542181	ISS A/S	Europe	Denmark	16 April 2026	Annual	Abstain Against	8h 10c 6 5	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the use of more than two types of concurrent variable pay arrangements.[RemunerationUK6] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
2037699	FI0009007884	Elisa Oyj	Europe	Finland	01 April 2026	Annual	All For				1
2010767	FI4000552500	Sampo Oyj	Europe	Finland	22 April 2026	Annual	All For				1
2083924	FI0009013403	Kone Oyj	Europe	Finland	03 June 2026	Extraordinary Shareholders	Against	8	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2]		1
2047120	FR0000125486	VINCI SA	Europe	France	14 April 2026	Annual/Special	All For				1
2048186	FR0000064578	Covivio SA	Europe	France	16 April 2026	Annual/Special	Against	14 7,8,10,11	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2051800	FR0000052292	Hermes International SCA	Europe	France	17 April 2026	Annual/Special	Against	5 7,8,9,11,18 6	Concern that there is insufficient evidence to justify that the related party transaction is sufficiently in the interests of the company.[DirectorElection4] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the proposal introduces anti-takeover measures which may prevent an offer to acquire shares being presented to long-term shareholders.[ShareholderRights2]		1
2042325	FR0010040865	Gecina SA	Europe	France	22 April 2026	Annual	Against	9,12	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2054200	FR0010451203	Rexel SA	Europe	France	22 April 2026	Annual/Special	Against	12,13	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3]		1
2038621	FR0000121014	LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton SE	Europe	France	23 April 2026	Annual/Special	Against	4,7,8,9,11,12,13,14,16,19,20	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2046805	FR0000120321	L'Oreal SA	Europe	France	24 April 2026	Annual/Special	Against	5	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3]	6,8	2
2051799	FR0000121667	EssilorLuxottica SA	Europe	France	28 April 2026	Annual/Special	Against	5,6,7,9,10,11,18	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
2046379	FR0010208488	ENGIE SA	Europe	France	29 April 2026	Annual/Special	Against	15,18	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2037546	FR0000120578	Sanofi	Europe	France	29 April 2026	Annual/Special	Against	10,16	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2049958	FR0012757854	SPIE SA	Europe	France	30 April 2026	Annual/Special	All For				1
2058181	FR0013326246	Unibail-Rodamco-Westfield SE	Europe	France	06 May 2026	Annual/Special	Against	18 6,7,8,9,10,13,14	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2062172	FR0000121964	Klepierre SA	Europe	France	07 May 2026	Annual/Special	Against	7	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3]		1
2059530	FR0000121972	Schneider Electric SE	Europe	France	07 May 2026	Annual/Special	Against	12	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		2
2047117	FR0000131104	BNP Paribas SA	Europe	France	12 May 2026	Annual/Special	Against	10,11,14,15,16	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2049957	FR0014004L86	Dassault Aviation SA	Europe	France	13 May 2026	Annual/Special	Against	10 11 4,5,6,8,9 17	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the proposal introduces anti-takeover measures which may prevent an offer to acquire shares being presented to long-term shareholders.[ShareholderRights2]		2
2064009	FR0010259150	Ipsen SA	Europe	France	13 May 2026	Annual/Special	Against	5,8 11,14,16	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2046380	FR0000133308	Orange SA	Europe	France	19 May 2026	Annual/Special	Against	8,10,15 6	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3]		1
2049955	FR0000125338	Capgemini SE	Europe	France	20 May 2026	Annual/Special	All For				1
2067848	FR0014003TT8	Dassault Systemes SE	Europe	France	20 May 2026	Annual/Special	Against	5,8,23,24	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
2049956	FR0000044448	Nexans SA	Europe	France	21 May 2026	Annual/Special	Against	5,11,12,15,18	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2050965	FR001400AJ45	Compagnie Generale des Etablissements Michelin SCA	Europe	France	22 May 2026	Annual/Special	Against	15 6,9,10,26	Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2059528	FR0010533075	Getlink SE	Europe	France	27 May 2026	Annual/Special	Against	11 7 15,18,22	Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2055739	FR0010307819	Legrand SA	Europe	France	27 May 2026	Annual/Special	All For				2
2053421	FR0000130809	Societe Generale SA	Europe	France	27 May 2026	Annual/Special	All For				1
2064057	FR0004125920	Amundi SA	Europe	France	02 June 2026	Annual	Against	22	Concerns that there is insufficient evidence of alignment to 1.5 degrees by the board, which is relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL2]		1
2062197	FR0000125007	Compagnie de Saint-Gobain SA	Europe	France	04 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2039623	DE0005557508	Deutsche Telekom AG	Europe	Germany	01 April 2026	Annual	Against	7.b),10	Concerns that the proposal will introduce or perpetuate diminished minority shareholder rights.[ShareholderRights3]		1
2033903	DE000ENAG999	E.ON SE	Europe	Germany	23 April 2026	Annual	Against	6	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2039652	DE000BAY0017	Bayer AG	Europe	Germany	24 April 2026	Annual	Against	8	Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1]		1
2039713	DE0006602006	GEA Group AG	Europe	Germany	29 April 2026	Annual	Against	3,7	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2039641	DE0008430026	Muenchener Rueckversicherungs-Gesellschaft AG	Europe	Germany	29 April 2026	Annual	Against	6	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2033951	DE0007010803	Rational AG	Europe	Germany	29 April 2026	Annual	Against	7,8 4 5,6	Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2039656	DE000BASF111	BASF SE	Europe	Germany	30 April 2026	Annual	Against	9 5a 6	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns that there is insufficient consideration of climate change in the audit and account by the board, which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2039739	DE000KBX1006	Knorr-Bremse AG	Europe	Germany	30 April 2026	Annual	Against	7c 7b 6	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2039666	DE0007037129	RWE AG	Europe	Germany	30 April 2026	Annual	Against	4.9	Concerns that there is insufficient consideration of climate change in the audit and account by the board, which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL1]		1
2039643	DE0005552004	Deutsche Post AG	Europe	Germany	05 May 2026	Annual	Against	6a 10	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2038343	DE0007164600	SAP SE	Europe	Germany	05 May 2026	Annual	All For			6	3
2039697	DE000DTR0CK8	Daimler Truck Holding AG	Europe	Germany	06 May 2026	Annual	Against	9 4.1	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the overreliance on total shareholder returns (TSR).[RemunerationUK5] 2- Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUK8] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3]	6,4,6,10	1
2039704	DE0008402215	Hannover Rueck SE	Europe	Germany	06 May 2026	Annual	Against	4a 6	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2039635	DE0008404005	Allianz SE	Europe	Germany	07 May 2026	Annual	Against	6,7	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]	8a	2
2039660	DE000A0D9PT0	MTU Aero Engines AG	Europe	Germany	07 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2039710	DE0008232125	Deutsche Lufthansa AG	Europe	Germany	12 May 2026	Annual	Against	5	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]	6a	1
2039786	DE0005773303	Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide	Europe	Germany	12 May 2026	Annual	Against	7.2 7.1	Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6]		1
2039648	DE0007030009	Rheinmetall AG	Europe	Germany	12 May 2026	Annual	Against	4,8	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]	3	1
2039728	DE000ZAL1111	Zalando SE	Europe	Germany	12 May 2026	Annual	Against	6	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2039024	DE0005810055	Deutsche Boerse AG	Europe	Germany	13 May 2026	Annual	All For				2
2039790	DE000A0Z2Z25	freenet AG	Europe	Germany	13 May 2026	Annual	Against	7.4,7.5 6,8	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2033905	DE0006047004	Heidelberg Materials AG	Europe	Germany	13 May 2026	Annual	Against	4.1,6	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2039736	DE000A1DAHH0	Brenntag SE	Europe	Germany	20 May 2026	Annual	Against	12 3	Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3]	6,7	1
2033900	DE000CBK1001	Commerzbank AG	Europe	Germany	20 May 2026	Annual	Against	9	Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1]	6	1
2033891	DE0008303504	TAG Immobilien AG	Europe	Germany	20 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2033897	DE0005089031	United Internet AG	Europe	Germany	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	6 8	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
2039653	DE000A1ML731	Vonovia SE	Europe	Germany	21 May 2026	Annual	All For				2
2039662	DE0005785604	Fresenius SE & Co. KGaA	Europe	Germany	22 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2039749	DE000HAG0005	HENSOLDT AG	Europe	Germany	22 May 2026	Annual	Against	4 5	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2033712	DE0005470306	CTS Eventim AG & Co. KGaA	Europe	Germany	27 May 2026	Annual	Against	7	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2039735	DE000LEG1110	LEG Immobilien SE	Europe	Germany	27 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2039640	DE0005140008	Deutsche Bank AG	Europe	Germany	28 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2073656	DE0007493991	Stroeer SE & Co. KGaA	Europe	Germany	03 June 2026	Annual	Against	8,10,12	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2039766	DE000RENK730	RENK Group AG	Europe	Germany	10 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2039788	DE0005158703	Bechtle AG	Europe	Germany	17 June 2026	Annual	Against	6	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2039731	DE000A12DM80	Scout24 SE	Europe	Germany	17 June 2026	Annual	Against	6	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
2048108	IE00BF0L3536	AIB Group plc	Europe	Ireland	30 April 2026	Annual	All For				1
2045741	IE0004927939	Kingspan Group Plc	Europe	Ireland	30 April 2026	Annual	All For				1
2047068	IE00028FXN24	Smurfit WestRock Plc	Europe	Ireland	01 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2056642	IE00BLS09M33	Pentair plc	Europe	Ireland	05 May 2026	Annual	Against	1e	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
2053797	IE0001827041	CRH Plc	Europe	Ireland	07 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2061967	IE00BDVJJQ56	nVent Electric Plc	Europe	Ireland	15 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2059782	IE00BDB6Q211	Willis Towers Watson Public Limited Company	Europe	Ireland	20 May 2026	Annual	Against	1g	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
2073525	IE00BK9ZQ967	Trane Technologies Plc	Europe	Ireland	04 June 2026	Annual	Against	1g,3	Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1]		1
2077673	IE00BLP1HW54	Aon Plc	Europe	Ireland	26 June 2026	Annual	Against	1a 11 4,5 2	Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2036592	IT0005218380	Banco BPM SpA	Europe	Italy	16 April 2026	Annual	Against	7.2 6.1c,6.1f,6.1i,6.1m,6.1n,6.1o, 6.1p,6.1q,6.1r,6.1s,6.1t	Cumulative/slate voting in favour of individual candidates/slates.[DirectorElection2]		2
2041520	IT0004176001	Prysmian SpA	Europe	Italy	16 April 2026	Annual/Special	Against	O7,O8	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2036581	IT0005211237	Italgas SpA	Europe	Italy	21 April 2026	Annual/Special	Against	0030,0040,0050	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2019134	IT0004965148	Moncler SpA	Europe	Italy	21 April 2026	Annual	Against	4.1.1,4.2,4.3 2.1,7	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2037514	IT0000066123	BPER Banca SpA	Europe	Italy	23 April 2026	Annual	Against	4a2,4b,4d	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2029221	IT0000072170	FinecoBank SpA	Europe	Italy	29 April 2026	Annual/Special	Against	8,9 6.1k,6.1i,6.1m,6.1n,6.1o,6.1p ,6.1q	Cumulative/slate voting in favour of individual candidates/slates.[DirectorElection2]		1
2037235	IT0003828271	Recordati SpA	Europe	Italy	29 April 2026	Annual/Special	Against	2a2,2b,2c 3b	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2029461	IT0003153415	SNAM SpA	Europe	Italy	29 April 2026	Annual	Against	O6.1	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2034734	IT0004810054	Unipol Assicurazioni SpA	Europe	Italy	29 April 2026	Annual/Special	Against	0030,0040,0050	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2026724	IT0000072618	Intesa Sanpaolo SpA	Europe	Italy	30 April 2026	Annual/Special	All For				1
2063284	IT0005239360	UniCredit SpA	Europe	Italy	04 May 2026	Extraordinary Shareholders	All For				2
2031063	IT0003128367	Enel SpA	Europe	Italy	12 May 2026	Annual/Special	Against	006B,0070		0090,0100,0110	1
2037559	IT0003242622	TERNA Rete Elettrica Nazionale SpA	Europe	Italy	12 May 2026	Annual	Against	3,4,5,2,6,7,8,1,9 10,11,12,1	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		3
2030562	IT0001347308	Buzzi SpA	Europe	Italy	13 May 2026	Annual/Special	Against	0030,0040,0050,0070,008B,0 090 0110 0010	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3]		1
2090164	IT0000072170	FinecoBank SpA	Europe	Italy	29 June 2026	Extraordinary Shareholders	All For				1

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2049165	LU1778762911	Spotify Technology SA	Europe	Luxembourg	15 April 2026	Annual	Against	6. 4b 4a	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the proposal supports multiple class share structures with unequal voting rights which limits the interests of minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights4] Concerns that the proposal supports multiple class share structures with unequal voting rights which limits the interests of minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights4] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		2
2056850	FR0014000MR3	Eurofins Scientific SE	Europe	Luxembourg	23 April 2026	Annual/Special	Against	9,10	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the total shareholder returns (TSR) vesting for below median performance. Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on over-reliance on share options.[Remuneration8]	12	2
2068085	LU2290522684	InPost SA	Europe	Luxembourg	15 May 2026	Annual	Against	7.	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
2087727	LU1673108939	Aroundtown SA	Europe	Luxembourg	24 June 2026	Annual	Against	11. 16.,17.	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2087687	LU2290522684	InPost SA	Europe	Luxembourg	29 June 2026	Extraordinary Shareholders	All For				1
2046017	NL0015001FS8	Ferrovial NV	Europe	Netherlands	09 April 2026	Annual	Against	3.	There is a lack of a sufficiently credible transition plan to underpin the emissions reduction targets, as well as an overreliance on offsets to achieve 20% of the emissions reductions by 2030.		2
2037518	NL0011821202	ING Groep NV	Europe	Netherlands	14 April 2026	Annual	All For			5.A.	1
2048325	NL0000687663	AerCap Holdings NV	Europe	Netherlands	15 April 2026	Annual	Against	2.,12.	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2034968	NL0011585146	Ferrari NV	Europe	Netherlands	15 April 2026	Annual	Against	3.d. 2.c.	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2048953	NL0012044747	Redcare Pharmacy NV	Europe	Netherlands	15 April 2026	Annual	Against	2.c.,5.a.,5.b.	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2040157	NL0015435975	Davide Campari-Milano NV	Europe	Netherlands	16 April 2026	Annual	Against	2.b. 5.b. 6.	48131 Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the significant use of qualitative metrics.[RemunerationUK3] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
2013756	NL0010273215	ASML Holding NV	Europe	Netherlands	22 April 2026	Annual	All For			3.a.,5	2
2040105	NL0009432491	Royal Vopak NV	Europe	Netherlands	22 April 2026	Annual	Against	3.,8.	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2044198	NL0013267909	Akzo Nobel NV	Europe	Netherlands	23 April 2026	Annual	Against	5.b. 6.b.	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3]		1
2035755	NL0000009165	Heineken NV	Europe	Netherlands	23 April 2026	Annual	Against	1.c.,3.	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2040154	NL0010801007	IMCD NV	Europe	Netherlands	30 April 2026	Annual	Against	6.a. 2.c.	Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2045857	NL0010832176	argenx SE	Europe	Netherlands	06 May 2026	Annual	Against	7. 3.	Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2055387	NL0015002MS2	The Magnum Ice Cream Co. N.V.	Europe	Netherlands	07 May 2026	Annual	Against	6.a. 4.,5.	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2039737	NL0000009538	Koninklijke Philips NV	Europe	Netherlands	08 May 2026	Annual	Against	3.e.	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2028506	NL0000334118	ASM International NV	Europe	Netherlands	11 May 2026	Annual	Against	3.a.,5.	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2056809	NL0006294274	Euronext NV	Europe	Netherlands	20 May 2026	Annual	Against	3.b.	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2040107	NL0010773842	NN Group NV	Europe	Netherlands	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	10.B. 5.	Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2044939	NL0000395903	Wolters Kluwer NV	Europe	Netherlands	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	5.a. 2.d. 10.	Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the proposal will introduce or perpetuate diminished minority shareholder rights.[ShareholderRights3]		1
2067450	NL0009434992	LyondellBasell Industries N.V.	Europe	Netherlands	22 May 2026	Annual	All For				1

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2059483	NL0000226223	STMicroelectronics NV	Europe	Netherlands	27 May 2026	Annual	Against	11.	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3]		1
2035530	NL0012969182	Adyen NV	Europe	Netherlands	28 May 2026	Annual	All For				2
2082489	NL0015000LU4	Iveco Group NV	Europe	Netherlands	17 June 2026	Annual	Against	4.i. 4.h. 4.e.,4.g. 2.d. 6.c.	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
2063190	NL0012846349	Unibail-Rodamco-Westfield NV	Europe	Netherlands	18 June 2026	Annual	Against	6. 1.	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2084419	NL0015002SN0	QIAGEN NV	Europe	Netherlands	24 June 2026	Annual	Against	6.h. 2.,8.	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2039855	NO0010161896	DNB Bank ASA	Europe	Norway	21 April 2026	Annual	All For				1
2084401	NO0003054108	Mowi ASA	Europe	Norway	03 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2040236	NO0010310956	SalMar ASA	Europe	Norway	22 June 2026	Annual	Against	9,10	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2058151	PTEDP0AM0009	EDP SA	Europe	Portugal	16 April 2026	Annual	Against	3.1,3.2,3.3			1
2068672	PTBCP0AM0015	Banco Comercial Portugues SA	Europe	Portugal	07 May 2026	Annual	Against	3,9,13			1
2046021	ES0180907000	Unicaja Banco SA	Europe	Spain	09 April 2026	Annual	Against	5.1,5.3,5.4 5.2	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3]		1
2050466	ES0127797019	EDP Renewables SA	Europe	Spain	13 April 2026	Annual	Against	9 6	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3]		2
2047590	ES0105046017	Aena S.M.E. SA	Europe	Spain	16 April 2026	Annual	Against	10 11	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that there is insufficient evidence of alignment to 1.5 degrees by the board, which is relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL2]		2
2057836	ES0130670112	Endesa SA	Europe	Spain	28 April 2026	Annual	Against	10	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2058201	ES0167050915	ACS, Actividades de Construcción y Servicios SA	Europe	Spain	07 May 2026	Annual	Against	4,5	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2065942	ES0173093024	Redeia Corporacion SA	Europe	Spain	12 May 2026	Annual	Against	6.1 7.1	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		3
2055129	ES0144580Y14	Iberdrola SA	Europe	Spain	29 May 2026	Annual	All For			12,16	1
2073417	ES0109067019	Amadeus IT Group SA	Europe	Spain	02 June 2026	Annual	Against	3	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
2084706	ES0125220311	Acciona SA	Europe	Spain	24 June 2026	Annual	Against	3.1,3.2	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2089360	ES0118594417	Indra Sistemas SA	Europe	Spain	29 June 2026	Annual	Against	7	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2012450	SE0021921269	Saab AB	Europe	Sweden	01 April 2026	Annual	Against	11.e) 11.h) 13 15.a),15.b),15.c) 11.i),11.k)	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the use of more than two types of concurrent variable pay arrangements.[RemunerationUK6] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
2039833	SE0000115446	Volvo AB	Europe	Sweden	08 April 2026	Annual	Against	14.2,14.3,14.10,15 20	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Shareholder proposal would result in material additional disclosures that would be decision-useful to investors and would be an efficient use of company resources.[ShareholderProposal10]		1

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2008099	SE0000190126	Industrivarden AB	Europe	Sweden	13 April 2026	Annual	Against	12.g 12.f 12.b,12.h 12.a,12.e 12.j 16	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concernsrelated to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2040298	SE0000108847	LE Lundbergforetagen AB	Europe	Sweden	20 April 2026	Annual	Against	12	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3]		1
2012943	SE0000114837	Trelleborg AB	Europe	Sweden	23 April 2026	Annual	Against	13a,13h 13b,13c 15	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2039867	SE0015961909	Hexagon AB	Europe	Sweden	24 April 2026	Annual	Against	12.2,12.3 14,16	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2014619	SE0007100581	ASSA ABLOY AB	Europe	Sweden	28 April 2026	Annual	Against	12 14,15,17	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2009366	SE0017486889	Atlas Copco AB	Europe	Sweden	28 April 2026	Annual	Against	10a8,10c 10a4 10a2,10a9,12a,12b	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] 2- Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing risks in its business and wider supply chain related to the respect of human rights which are relevant and material to business opportunity and risk and that changes in board composition would help improve governance and the effectiveness of management in pursuit of long-term value creation [HumanRights1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		3
2016108	SE0020050417	Boliden AB	Europe	Sweden	28 April 2026	Annual	All For				1
2035828	SE0000667891	Sandvik Aktiebolag	Europe	Sweden	28 April 2026	Annual	Against	14.1,14.4 14.6 17,18,19	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2016780	SE0015658109	Epiroc AB	Europe	Sweden	05 May 2026	Annual	Against	10a9,12	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]	8d,10a.2,10a.4,10b	1
2008880	SE0015811963	Investor AB	Europe	Sweden	07 May 2026	Annual	Against	14E,14H 14G 14J 14C,14F,14i,15 9	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficientlyaligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2

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2039900	SE0005190238	Tele2 AB	Europe	Sweden	18 May 2026	Annual	Against	16 15a 15c,15g 18	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2038345	CH0011075394	Zurich Insurance Group AG	Europe	Switzerland	08 April 2026	Annual	Against	6 1.2	Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal. Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.		1
2042290	CH0102484968	Julius Baer Gruppe AG	Europe	Switzerland	09 April 2026	Annual	Against	9 1.2	Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2042287	CH1243598427	Sandoz Group AG	Europe	Switzerland	09 April 2026	Annual	Against	5.1.a,5.1.g,5.2.1 9	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions,[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1]		1
2042286	CH0126881561	Swiss Re AG	Europe	Switzerland	10 April 2026	Annual	Against	8 1.2	Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2034330	CH0030170408	Geberit AG	Europe	Switzerland	15 April 2026	Annual	Against	9 5.1.3 8.1	Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
2033601	CH0244767585	UBS Group AG	Europe	Switzerland	15 April 2026	Annual	Against	11 2	Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
2039013	CH0010570759	Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli AG	Europe	Switzerland	16 April 2026	Annual	Against	9 7.1.2 7.1.7,7.2.1 7.1.5,7.4 2	Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3] Concerns related to the chair not being fully independent of the company, which in our view may at times compromise the ability to oversee the executives of the company in the interests of minority shareholders.[BoardStructure4] Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2042279	CH0038863350	Nestle SA	Europe	Switzerland	16 April 2026	Annual	All For			1.2	1
2036763	CH1175448666	Straumann Holding AG	Europe	Switzerland	17 April 2026	Annual	Against	10 6.7 1.3,5.4	Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2034255	CH0130293662	BKW AG	Europe	Switzerland	28 April 2026	Annual	Against	7	Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1]		2
2042282	CH0432492467	Alcon AG	Europe	Switzerland	30 April 2026	Annual	Against	10 5.1	Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2041135	CH0531751755	Banque Cantonale Vaudoise	Europe	Switzerland	30 April 2026	Annual	Against	10 5.4	Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2036261	CH0014852781	Swiss Life Holding AG	Europe	Switzerland	07 May 2026	Annual	Against	5.7,5.13 9 5.4,5.8 5.1,5.2,5.9,5.11,5.14 5,5,7	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1]		2
2037535	CH0024608827	Partners Group Holding AG	Europe	Switzerland	20 May 2026	Annual	Against	7	Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1]		2

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2064323	CH0044328745	Chubb Limited	Europe	Switzerland	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	5.2 5.11 A 6	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] EOS manual override, see analyst note		2
2072869	CH0114405324	Garmin Ltd.	Europe	Switzerland	05 June 2026	Annual	Against	A 5b,7b	Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]		1
2035561	CH0012549785	Sonova Holding AG	Europe	Switzerland	16 June 2026	Annual	Against	6 4.1	Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
2041683	CA2849025093	Eldorado Gold Corporation	North America	Canada	07 April 2026	Special	All For				1
2033957	CA7800871021	Royal Bank of Canada	North America	Canada	09 April 2026	Annual	Against	1.10 9.10 6,7	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing deforestation risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[BiodiversityGL1] 2- Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3] Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal. Shareholder proposal would result in material additional disclosures that would be decision-useful to investors and would be an efficient use of company resources.		1
2027610	CA8911605092	The Toronto-Dominion Bank	North America	Canada	16 April 2026	Annual	Against	1.3 9 6,7	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing deforestation risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[BiodiversityGL1] 2- Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3] 3- Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1] Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal. Shareholder proposal would result in material additional disclosures that would be decision-useful to investors and would be an efficient use of company resources.		1
2045036	CA8849038812	Thomson Reuters Corporation	North America	Canada	28 April 2026	Special	All For				1
2041074	CA13646K1084	Canadian Pacific Kansas City Limited	North America	Canada	29 April 2026	Annual	Against	4.10 2	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8]Pay appears misaligned to value to shareholders, based on analysis of Total Shareholder Return performance and consideration of CEO pay relative to company peers.[RemunerationUS1]Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
2041108	CA14071L1085	Capstone Copper Corp.	North America	Canada	30 April 2026	Annual/Special	Against	2.1 2.8 2.4 4	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to overall board diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2039116	CA4969024047	Kinross Gold Corporation	North America	Canada	30 April 2026	Annual	Against	1.10	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS1]		1
2037126	CA6979001089	Pan American Silver Corp.	North America	Canada	30 April 2026	Annual/Special	All For				1
2041605	CA0084741085	Agnico Eagle Mines Limited	North America	Canada	01 May 2026	Annual/Special	Against	1.6	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
2039140	CA1363751027	Canadian National Railway Company	North America	Canada	01 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2041684	CA87262K1057	TMX Group Limited	North America	Canada	05 May 2026	Annual/Special	All For				1
2041668	CA45823T1066	Intact Financial Corporation	North America	Canada	06 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.11 1.10 4	Concerns related to overall board diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2041105	CA8667961053	Sun Life Financial Inc.	North America	Canada	06 May 2026	Annual/Special	All For				1
2038736	CA05534B7604	BCE Inc.	North America	Canada	07 May 2026	Annual	All For				2
2041073	CA13321L1085	Cameco Corporation	North America	Canada	07 May 2026	Annual	Against	4			1
2044560	US2166485019	The Cooper Companies, Inc.	North America	USA	07 April 2026	Annual	Against	1a 3 1d	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8] Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]		1
2048377	US6153691059	Moodys Corporation	North America	USA	14 April 2026	Annual	Against	1j	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		2
2048968	US0640581007	The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation	North America	USA	14 April 2026	Annual	Against	1h,2	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2046780	US00724F1012	Adobe Inc.	North America	USA	15 April 2026	Annual	Against	1d 1b,1j,1k,4	Concern that the CEO/Chair has insufficient time to dedicate to their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2047721	US14448C1045	Carrier Global Corporation	North America	USA	15 April 2026	Annual	All For				1
2047887	US86800U3023	Super Micro Computer, Inc.	North America	USA	15 April 2026	Annual	Against	1c 1b 4	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk [Miscellaneous4] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2048445	US15189T1079	CenterPoint Energy, Inc.	North America	USA	16 April 2026	Annual	Against	1a,1b,1d,2,4	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]		1
2043142	US8716071076	Synopsys, Inc.	North America	USA	16 April 2026	Annual	Against	1g 3	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10]Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13]Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8]Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		2
2048387	US8825081040	Texas Instruments Incorporated	North America	USA	16 April 2026	Annual	All For				2
2055799	US5339001068	Lincoln Electric Holdings, Inc.	North America	USA	17 April 2026	Annual	Against	1.1 1.7 1.5,2 3	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10]Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13]Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
2047409	US11135F1012	Broadcom Inc.	North America	USA	20 April 2026	Annual	Against	1h,3	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
2052993	US16119P1084	Charter Communications, Inc.	North America	USA	21 April 2026	Annual	Against	1b,1e,1g,1i,2,3,5	Shareholder proposal would result in material additional disclosures that would be decision-useful to investors and would be an efficient use of company resources.[ShareholderProposal10]		1
2046510	US23804L1035	Datadog, Inc.	North America	USA	21 April 2026	Special	Against	1	Concerns that the proposal will introduce or perpetuate diminished minority shareholder rights.[ShareholderRights3]		1
2050665	US3167731005	Fifth Third Bancorp	North America	USA	21 April 2026	Annual	Against	1d	Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk [Miscellaneous4]		1
2051038	US55261F1049	M&T Bank Corporation	North America	USA	21 April 2026	Annual	All For				1
2051692	US6658591044	Northern Trust Corporation	North America	USA	21 April 2026	Annual	Against	1d	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
2053004	US7445731067	Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated	North America	USA	21 April 2026	Annual	Against	1j,5	Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1]		1
2051327	US9029733048	U.S. Bancorp	North America	USA	21 April 2026	Annual	All For				1
2053776	US1255231003	The Cigna Group	North America	USA	22 April 2026	Annual	Against	1c	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
2052252	US6934751057	The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.	North America	USA	22 April 2026	Annual	Against	1b 1f	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		2
2052007	US8243481061	The Sherwin-Williams Company	North America	USA	22 April 2026	Annual	Against	1f,3 5	Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
2050659	US1746101054	Citizens Financial Group, Inc.	North America	USA	23 April 2026	Annual	Against	1.10	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
2053760	US2810201077	Edison International	North America	USA	23 April 2026	Annual	Against	1h 1i 4	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		2
2045278	US3119001044	Fastenal Company	North America	USA	23 April 2026	Annual	Against	6	Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7]		2
2053767	US40412C1018	HCA Healthcare, Inc.	North America	USA	23 April 2026	Annual	Against	1d,1i,3	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9]Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10]Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13]		1
2046808	US46266C1053	IQVIA Holdings Inc.	North America	USA	23 April 2026	Annual	Against	1b,4,5	Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
2051924	US4781601046	Johnson & Johnson	North America	USA	23 April 2026	Annual	Against	1j	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing risks in its business and wider supply chain related to the respect of human rights which are relevant and material to business opportunity and risk and that changes in board composition would help improve governance and the effectiveness of management in pursuit of long-term value creation.[HumanRights1]	1f,3	2
2052818	US7170811035	Pfizer Inc.	North America	USA	23 April 2026	Annual	Against	1.5,5	Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]	1.8,1.9,2	2
2053814	US0028241000	Abbott Laboratories	North America	USA	24 April 2026	Annual	Against	1.9	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2052101	US3841091040	Graco Inc.	North America	USA	24 April 2026	Annual	Against	1a 3	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2053001	US7005171050	Park Hotels & Resorts Inc.	North America	USA	24 April 2026	Annual	Against	1B	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]		1
2055601	US8525431025	STAG Industrial, Inc.	North America	USA	27 April 2026	Annual	Against	1e	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		2
2054681	US0454871056	Associated Banc-Corp	North America	USA	28 April 2026	Annual	All For				1
2055972	US2103771097	Constellation Energy Corporation	North America	USA	28 April 2026	Annual	Against	1.5	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]		1
2054682	US2527843013	DiamondRock Hospitality Company	North America	USA	28 April 2026	Annual	All For				1
2055205	US29472R1086	Equity LifeStyle Properties, Inc.	North America	USA	28 April 2026	Annual	Against	1.4	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]		1
2055576	US30161N1019	Exelon Corporation	North America	USA	28 April 2026	Annual	Against	1c 3	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10]Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8]Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		2
2051335	US4592001014	International Business Machines Corporation	North America	USA	28 April 2026	Annual	Against	4 1g 1h 1b	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors. concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions. concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions. 2-Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing risks in its business and wider supply chain related to the respect of human rights which are relevant and material to business opportunity and risk and that changes in board composition would help improve governance and the effectiveness of management in pursuit of long-term value creation. 3-Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time. concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.	1,2,3	2
2055590	US6937181088	PACCAR Inc	North America	USA	28 April 2026	Annual	Against	1.12	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
2055835	US74340W1036	Prologis, Inc.	North America	USA	28 April 2026	Annual	Against	1c,1d,2	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
2055202	US7757111049	Rollins, Inc.	North America	USA	28 April 2026	Annual	Against	1.9 1.7 1.6 3	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that severance pay for a Named Executive Officer is inappropriately high with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS5]		2
2054398	US89832Q1094	Truist Financial Corporation	North America	USA	28 April 2026	Annual	All For				1
2055624	US9497461015	Wells Fargo & Company	North America	USA	28 April 2026	Annual	Against	4 2 5 7,8 1d 1j	Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently. Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors. Shareholder proposal promotes actions that should help achieve long-term value creation while safeguarding shareholder interests. Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal. concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions. 2-Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions. 3-Concern that the Chair and CEO role are combined, which can lead to a lack of independent oversight of management, particularly when insufficiently balanced by the presence of a Lead Independent Director with adequate powers to ensure the board may act independently of the Chair in certain circumstances. concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders. 2-Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing risks in its business and wider supply chain related to the respect of human rights which are relevant and material to business opportunity and risk and that changes in board composition would help improve governance and the effectiveness of management in pursuit of long-term value creation.	1c	2
2056626	US03076C1062	Ameriprise Financial, Inc.	North America	USA	29 April 2026	Annual	Against	1c 3	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13]Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8]Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		2
2055793	US0997241064	BorgWarner Inc.	North America	USA	29 April 2026	Annual	All For				1

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2054928	US1423391002	Carlisle Companies Incorporated	North America	USA	29 April 2026	Annual	Against	1a 1b 2	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13] Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
2053541	US1924221039	Cognex Corporation	North America	USA	29 April 2026	Annual	Against	1.2 4	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13]		1
2055198	US29670G1022	Essential Utilities, Inc.	North America	USA	29 April 2026	Annual	Against	1.6	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
2055466	US4595061015	International Flavors & Fragrances Inc.	North America	USA	29 April 2026	Annual	All For				1
2053762	US7458671010	PulteGroup, Inc.	North America	USA	29 April 2026	Annual	Against	1c 1b	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]		1
2054382	US78709Y1055	Saia, Inc.	North America	USA	29 April 2026	Annual	Against	1.8 1.9	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]		1
2056613	US38141G1040	The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.	North America	USA	29 April 2026	Annual	Against	2 1c 3 4 7 6 1f,1i	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to a perceived lack of response to relatively low shareholder support on remuneration-related proposals.[Remuneration9] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6] Shareholder proposal would result in material additional disclosures that would be decision-useful to investors and would be an efficient use of company resources.[ShareholderProposals10] Shareholder proposal would result in material additional disclosures that would be decision-useful to investors and would be an efficient use of company resources.[ShareholderProposal10] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]	1i	2
2051095	US3848021040	W.W. Grainger, Inc.	North America	USA	29 April 2026	Annual	All For				1
2055975	US0423157058	ARMOUR Residential REIT, Inc.	North America	USA	30 April 2026	Annual	Against	1a,1c	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6]		1
2055603	US1011371077	Boston Scientific Corporation	North America	USA	30 April 2026	Annual	Against	1a 8	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
2056623	US3755581036	Gilead Sciences, Inc.	North America	USA	30 April 2026	Annual	Against	6 5	Shareholder proposal would result in material additional disclosures that would be decision-useful to investors and would be an efficient use of company resources.[ShareholderProposal10] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		2
2055200	US37940X1028	Global Payments Inc.	North America	USA	30 April 2026	Annual	Against	1d,2	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2053002	US42250P1030	Healthpeak Properties, Inc.	North America	USA	30 April 2026	Annual	Against	1b 1e 2	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10]Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13]Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8]		1
2053790	US46120E6023	Intuitive Surgical, Inc.	North America	USA	30 April 2026	Annual	All For				1
2052753	US8330341012	Snap-on Incorporated	North America	USA	30 April 2026	Annual	Against	1.1	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]		2
2055978	US1713401024	Church & Dwight Co., Inc.	North America	USA	01 May 2026	Annual	Against	1i	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		2
2055588	US5184151042	Lattice Semiconductor Corporation	North America	USA	01 May 2026	Annual	Against	1h	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
2051952	US7835491082	Ryder System, Inc.	North America	USA	01 May 2026	Annual	Against	1i 1e 4	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2053772	US0846707026	Berkshire Hathaway Inc.	North America	USA	02 May 2026	Annual	Against	4 1.7,1.8,1.9,2,3	Shareholder proposal would result in material additional disclosures that would be decision-useful to investors and would be an efficient use of company resources.[ShareholderProposal10] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[BiodiversityUS1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2055509	US1720621010	Cincinnati Financial Corporation	North America	USA	02 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.3 3	Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
2055774	US0010551028	Aflac Incorporated	North America	USA	04 May 2026	Annual	Against	1k 4	Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		2
2057043	US0605051046	Bank of America Corporation	North America	USA	04 May 2026	Annual	Against	4	Shareholder proposal promotes actions that should help achieve long-term value creation while safeguarding shareholder interests.		3
2057149	US28618M1062	Element Solutions Inc	North America	USA	04 May 2026	Annual	Against	1b 1e 2	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2056674	US5324571083	Eli Lilly and Company	North America	USA	04 May 2026	Annual	Against	1b 1c,3,6	EOS manual override. Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
2063829	US70432V1026	Paycom Software, Inc.	North America	USA	04 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.2 1.1 3	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2066531	US88339J1051	The Trade Desk, Inc.	North America	USA	04 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.2 2	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concern that the Chair and CEO role are combined, which can lead to a lack of independent oversight of management, particularly when insufficiently balanced by the presence of a Lead Independent Director with adequate powers to ensure the board may act independently of the Chair in certain circumstances.[IndividualDirector2] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
2057133	US90353T1007	Uber Technologies, Inc.	North America	USA	04 May 2026	Annual	All For				2
2052831	US9553061055	West Pharmaceutical Services, Inc.	North America	USA	04 May 2026	Annual	Against	4	Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
2058281	US0258161092	American Express Company	North America	USA	05 May 2026	Annual	Against	1b,1k	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.		1
2058490	US1101221083	Bristol-Myers Squibb Company	North America	USA	05 May 2026	Annual	Against	5	Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		2
2056753	US1468691027	Carvana Co.	North America	USA	05 May 2026	Annual	Against	1b 3 6	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
2058317	US2358511028	Danaher Corporation	North America	USA	05 May 2026	Annual	Against	1c,1h	Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2055851	US25746U1097	Dominion Energy, Inc.	North America	USA	05 May 2026	Annual	Against	4	Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
2058906	US26884U1097	EPR Properties	North America	USA	05 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2057835	US3021301094	Expeditors International of Washington, Inc.	North America	USA	05 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.7	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
2053046	US3696043013	GE Aerospace	North America	USA	05 May 2026	Annual	Against	1a	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
2057126	US40637H1095	Halozyme Therapeutics, Inc.	North America	USA	05 May 2026	Annual	Against	1B 1A 2	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13] Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
2057120	US4435106079	Hubbell Incorporated	North America	USA	05 May 2026	Annual	Against	1c,1e,1g,1k,2	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13]		1

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2059353	US6819191064	Omnicom Group Inc.	North America	USA	05 May 2026	Annual	Against	1c 1h 2	Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
2059324	US6882392011	Oshkosh Corporation	North America	USA	05 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.4 3	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8] Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
2055986	US0138721065	Alcoa Corporation	North America	USA	06 May 2026	Annual	Against	1k	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]	1c	1
2055586	US02005N1000	Ally Financial Inc.	North America	USA	06 May 2026	Annual	Against	1h 1d 6 1b,3	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6] Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1]		1
2059719	US0383361039	AptarGroup, Inc.	North America	USA	06 May 2026	Annual	Against	1b	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5]		1
2057899	US1152361010	Brown & Brown, Inc.	North America	USA	06 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.12	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		2
2060083	US30040W1080	Eversource Energy	North America	USA	06 May 2026	Annual	Against	4	Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
2059720	US3137451015	Federal Realty Investment Trust	North America	USA	06 May 2026	Annual	All For				2
2056971	US3397501012	Floor & Decor Holdings, Inc.	North America	USA	06 May 2026	Annual	Against	1i	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
2059122	US45167R1041	IDEX Corporation	North America	USA	06 May 2026	Annual	Against	1a 1b 2	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13] Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
2058326	US60871R2094	Molson Coors Beverage Company	North America	USA	06 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.2	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6]		1
2059500	US74460D1090	Public Storage	North America	USA	06 May 2026	Annual	Against	1a	Concerns relating to the attendance of a director, which appears to be lower than 75% of the relevant board and committee meetings expected annually without clear justification of their absence.[BoardStructure2]		1
2058287	US7588491032	Regency Centers Corporation	North America	USA	06 May 2026	Annual	All For				2
2058160	US8581191009	Steel Dynamics, Inc.	North America	USA	06 May 2026	Annual	Against	4	Shareholder proposal would result in material additional disclosures that would be decision-useful to investors and would be an efficient use of company resources.[ShareholderProposal10]		1
2057074	US8636671013	Stryker Corporation	North America	USA	06 May 2026	Annual	Against	1g 1a 1b 3	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13] Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
2052045	US0311001004	AMETEK, Inc.	North America	USA	07 May 2026	Annual	Against	1c 1b,3	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1]		2
2057881	US12541W2098	C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.	North America	USA	07 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2058497	US1273871087	Cadence Design Systems, Inc.	North America	USA	07 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.2 1.1 3	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13]		2
2067685	US2199481068	Corpay, Inc.	North America	USA	07 May 2026	Annual	Against	1i 3 1d 4	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to a perceived lack of response to relatively low shareholder support on remuneration-related proposals.[Remuneration9] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1

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2058965	US2315611010	Curtiss-Wright Corporation	North America	USA	07 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.8 1.7 3	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10]Concerns that severance pay for a Named Executive Officer is inappropriately high with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS5]Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
2052961	US2333311072	DTE Energy Company	North America	USA	07 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.2	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]		1
2056411	US26441C2044	Duke Energy Corporation	North America	USA	07 May 2026	Annual	Against	1c,1d	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]		1
2057873	US2774321002	Eastman Chemical Company	North America	USA	07 May 2026	Annual	Against	5	Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
2056640	US2788651006	Ecolab Inc.	North America	USA	07 May 2026	Annual	Against	1d,1e,1m,4	Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		2
2059304	US28176E1082	Edwards Lifesciences Corporation	North America	USA	07 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.5	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		2
2046044	CA2861812014	Element Fleet Management Corp.	North America	Canada	07 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2059690	US2944291051	Equifax Inc.	North America	USA	07 May 2026	Annual	Against	1i,5	Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
2043071	CA29446Y5020	Equinox Gold Corp.	North America	Canada	07 May 2026	Annual	Against	2.4	Concerns related to overall board diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL4]		1
2043125	CA3359341052	First Quantum Minerals Ltd.	North America	Canada	07 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2041572	CA39138C1068	Great-West Lifeco Inc.	North America	Canada	07 May 2026	Annual/Special	Against	2.15	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to overall board diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL4] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
2041691	CA45075E1043	IA Financial Corporation Inc.	North America	Canada	07 May 2026	Annual	Against	6 5	EOS manual override, see analyst note Shareholder proposal promotes actions that should help achieve long-term value creation while safeguarding shareholder interests.[ShareholderProposal8]		1
2059329	US46187W1071	Invitation Homes Inc.	North America	USA	07 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.3	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
2057953	US46284V1017	Iron Mountain Incorporated	North America	USA	07 May 2026	Annual	All For				2
2059841	US50012A1088	Kodiak Gas Services, Inc.	North America	USA	07 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.1	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5]		1
2039868	CA5503721063	Lundin Mining Corporation	North America	Canada	07 May 2026	Annual	Against	1G 1A 1F	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to overall board diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL4]		1
2055460	US5926881054	Mettler-Toledo International Inc.	North America	USA	07 May 2026	Annual	All For				2
2059739	US6558441084	Norfolk Southern Corporation	North America	USA	07 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2055144	US62944T1051	NVR, Inc.	North America	USA	07 May 2026	Annual	Against	1e 5 4	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3] Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
2057956	US7607591002	Republic Services, Inc.	North America	USA	07 May 2026	Annual	Against	1m	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		2
2039216	CA7847301032	SSR Mining Inc.	North America	Canada	07 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2054934	US74144T1088	T. Rowe Price Group, Inc.	North America	USA	07 May 2026	Annual	All For			1g	2
2056040	US9113121068	United Parcel Service, Inc.	North America	USA	07 May 2026	Annual	Against	1c 1f 7 5	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions. Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk. Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7] Shareholder proposal seeks to protect and, where appropriate, advance shareholder rights on behalf of institutional investors.	1i,2	1
2058993	US92939U1060	WEC Energy Group, Inc.	North America	USA	07 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2044015	CA92938W2022	WSP Global Inc.	North America	Canada	07 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2057145	US00287Y1091	AbbVie Inc.	North America	USA	08 May 2026	Annual	Against	1a,5	Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		2
2039432	CA06849F1080	Barrick Mining Corporation	North America	Canada	08 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.2	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
2059759	US1331311027	Camden Property Trust	North America	USA	08 May 2026	Annual	Against	1i	Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
2058555	US14040H1059	Capital One Financial Corporation	North America	USA	08 May 2026	Annual	Against	1e 1g	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		2

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2058980	US1258961002	CMS Energy Corporation	North America	USA	08 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2058282	US1941621039	Colgate-Palmolive Company	North America	USA	08 May 2026	Annual	Against	1b 5 1e	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions. Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value. oncern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions. 2-Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.		1
2060161	US29364G1031	Entergy Corporation	North America	USA	08 May 2026	Annual	Against	1i	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]		1
2041132	CA4495861060	IGM Financial Inc.	North America	Canada	08 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.14	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6]		1
2059706	US4523081093	Illinois Tool Works, Inc.	North America	USA	08 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2059670	US8807701029	Teradyne, Inc.	North America	USA	08 May 2026	Annual	All For			1b,1e,2	1
2056910	US7433151039	The Progressive Corporation	North America	USA	08 May 2026	Annual	All For				2
2058489	US9113631090	United Rentals, Inc.	North America	USA	08 May 2026	Annual	All For				2
2057955	US9291601097	Vulcan Materials Company	North America	USA	08 May 2026	Annual	Against	1c	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5]		1
2041657	CA9628791027	Wheaton Precious Metals Corp.	North America	Canada	08 May 2026	Annual/Special	All For				1
2060164	US4601461035	International Paper Company	North America	USA	11 May 2026	Annual	Against	1f 1d	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]		1
2060676	US65473P1057	NiSource Inc.	North America	USA	11 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2058482	US88579Y1010	3M Company	North America	USA	12 May 2026	Annual	All For			1f	1
2057200	US3635761097	Arthur J. Gallagher & Co.	North America	USA	12 May 2026	Annual	Against	1g	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
2062347	US1921085049	Coeur Mining, Inc.	North America	USA	12 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2061019	US1264081035	CSX Corporation	North America	USA	12 May 2026	Annual	Against	1l 1h	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		2
2063828	US2310211063	Cummins Inc.	North America	USA	12 May 2026	Annual	Against	15	Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
2043101	CA2483561072	Denison Mines Corp.	North America	Canada	12 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.8 2	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9]		1
2059303	US26142V1052	DraftKings Inc.	North America	USA	12 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.2 1.10 1.7 3 1.5	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concern that the Chair and CEO role are combined, which can lead to a lack of independent oversight of management, particularly when insufficiently balanced by the presence of a Lead Independent Director with adequate powers to ensure the board may act independently of the Chair in certain circumstances.[IndividualDirector2] Concerns related to board oversight and the necessary evaluation of the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time to determine the board fit for purpose [BoardEvaluationUS1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS1]		1
2060162	US2971781057	Essex Property Trust, Inc.	North America	USA	12 May 2026	Annual	Against	1h	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3]		1
2041690	CA3518581051	Franco-Nevada Corporation	North America	Canada	12 May 2026	Annual/Special	All For				1
2060085	US45168D1046	IDEXX Laboratories, Inc.	North America	USA	12 May 2026	Annual	Against	1c 6	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Shareholder proposal seeks to protect and, where appropriate, advance shareholder rights on behalf of institutional investors.[ShareholderProposal9]		1
2059331	US6516391066	Newmont Corporation	North America	USA	12 May 2026	Annual	All For				2
2056926	US6374171063	NNN REIT, Inc.	North America	USA	12 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2057129	US71844V2016	Phillips Edison & Company, Inc.	North America	USA	12 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2061293	US7244791007	Pitney Bowes Inc.	North America	USA	12 May 2026	Annual	Against	1d 2 1b	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1] Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1], see analyst note		1
2059310	US7443201022	Prudential Financial, Inc.	North America	USA	12 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.5 4	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2059709	US8168511090	Sempra	North America	USA	12 May 2026	Annual	Against	1f 1a 3 4 1h,2	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13] 2- Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9] 3- Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] 4- Pay appears misaligned to value to shareholders, based on analysis of Total Shareholder Return performance and consideration of CEO pay relative to company peers.[RemunerationUS1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6] Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1]		1
2061957	US78473E1038	SPX Technologies, Inc.	North America	USA	12 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.2 1.1 2	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13] Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
2061761	US94106L1098	Waste Management, Inc.	North America	USA	12 May 2026	Annual	All For				2
2061644	US9297401088	Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation	North America	USA	12 May 2026	Annual	Against	1b	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5]		1
2060141	US0079031078	Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.	North America	USA	13 May 2026	Annual	Against	1g 5	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		2
2061961	US00971T1016	Akamai Technologies, Inc.	North America	USA	13 May 2026	Annual	Against	6 1.8 2 8	Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Shareholder proposal would result in material additional disclosures that would be decision-useful to investors and would be an efficient use of company resources.[ShareholderProposal10]		1
2061970	US0268747849	American International Group, Inc.	North America	USA	13 May 2026	Annual	Against	1d,2	Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8] Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		2
2057632	US0304201033	American Water Works Company, Inc.	North America	USA	13 May 2026	Annual	All For				2
2060334	US0367521038	Elevance Health, Inc.	North America	USA	13 May 2026	Annual	All For			1.3,3	1
2063835	US29444U7000	Equinix, Inc.	North America	USA	13 May 2026	Annual	Against	1i 2 4	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		2
2063792	US3364331070	First Solar, Inc.	North America	USA	13 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.7 4	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Shareholder proposal seeks to protect and, where appropriate, advance shareholder rights on behalf of institutional investors.[ShareholderProposal9]		2
2056043	US45378A1060	Independence Realty Trust, Inc.	North America	USA	13 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2059618	US45579U1097	Indivior Pharmaceuticals, Inc.	North America	USA	13 May 2026	Annual	Against	1e 1f 2	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8] Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
2062878	US4576693075	Insmed Incorporated	North America	USA	13 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.1	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5]		1
2057140	US4581401001	Intel Corporation	North America	USA	13 May 2026	Annual	Against	1g,1i,1k,3,4	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
2063407	US49456B1017	Kinder Morgan, Inc.	North America	USA	13 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.4	EOS manual override.		1
2067098	US55305B1017	M/I Homes, Inc.	North America	USA	13 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.1 2	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9]		1

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2043583	CA7392391016	Power Corporation of Canada	North America	Canada	13 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.11 1.3 1.2 1.6 3 5	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] 2- Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to below-board racial and/or ethnic diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL2] Concerns related to overall board diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9] 2- Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] 3- Concerns that severance pay for a Named Executive Officer is inappropriately high with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS5] Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7]		1
2062633	US8288061091	Simon Property Group, Inc.	North America	USA	13 May 2026	Annual	Against	1a 2 1e	Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to a perceived lack of response to relatively low shareholder support on remuneration-related proposals.[Remuneration9]Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5]		1
2064276	US8425871071	The Southern Company	North America	USA	13 May 2026	Annual	Against	1h,1k 9	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7]		1
2062901	US92276F1003	Ventas, Inc.	North America	USA	13 May 2026	Annual	Against	1h	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
2059779	US92338C1036	Veralto Corporation	North America	USA	13 May 2026	Annual	Against	1c	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5]		1
2063802	US92532F1003	Vertex Pharmaceuticals Incorporated	North America	USA	13 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2063815	US0084921008	Agree Realty Corporation	North America	USA	14 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.2	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5]		1
2060181	US02665T3068	American Homes 4 Rent	North America	USA	14 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2057139	US00206R1023	AT&T Inc.	North America	USA	14 May 2026	Annual	All For				2
2057834	US01741R1023	ATI Inc.	North America	USA	14 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.3	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5]		1
2063307	US12503M1080	Cboe Global Markets, Inc.	North America	USA	14 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2064372	US1266501006	CVS Health Corporation	North America	USA	14 May 2026	Annual	Against	1i 1m	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] 2- Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] 3- Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing risks in its business and wider supply chain related to the respect of human rights which are relevant and material to business opportunity and risk and that changes in board composition would help improve governance and the effectiveness of management in pursuit of long-term value creation.[HumanRights1] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
2059668	US3453708600	Ford Motor Company	North America	USA	14 May 2026	Annual	Against	1i 1j,1o 4,5	1) Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] 2) Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Shareholder proposal seeks to protect and, where appropriate, advance shareholder rights on behalf of institutional investors.[ShareholderProposal9]		1
2064173	US4131971040	Harmony Biosciences Holdings, Inc.	North America	USA	14 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.4 3	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2062906	US49803T3005	Kite Realty Group Trust	North America	USA	14 May 2026	Annual	Against	1c 1j	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3]		1
2063803	US5128161099	Lamar Advertising Company	North America	USA	14 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.2 1.5 1.6 3	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9]		1
2040565	CA56501R1064	Manulife Financial Corporation	North America	Canada	14 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.2,2	Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1]		1
2069485	US5732841060	Martin Marietta Materials, Inc.	North America	USA	14 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.1	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]	1.4	1

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2059990	US61174X1090	Monster Beverage Corporation	North America	USA	14 May 2026	Annual	Against	1j	Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
2063886	US6174464486	Morgan Stanley	North America	USA	14 May 2026	Annual	Against	4	Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.	1e,1g	2
2062223	US64119V3033	NetSTREIT Corp.	North America	USA	14 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2043581	CA66987E2069	NovaGold Resources Inc.	North America	Canada	14 May 2026	Annual	Against	1j 1f 6	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2059761	US6703461052	Nucor Corporation	North America	USA	14 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.4	oncern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions. 2-Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.		1
2060335	US67103H1077	O'Reilly Automotive, Inc.	North America	USA	14 May 2026	Annual	Against	4	Shareholder proposal would result in material additional disclosures that would be decision-useful to investors and would be an efficient use of company resources.[ShareholderProposal10]		1
2063379	US6821891057	ON Semiconductor Corporation	North America	USA	14 May 2026	Annual	Against	1g 4	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Shareholder proposal seeks to protect and, where appropriate, advance shareholder rights on behalf of institutional investors.[ShareholderProposal9]		1
2042762	CA85472N1096	Stantec Inc.	North America	Canada	14 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2059359	US8923561067	Tractor Supply Company	North America	USA	14 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.9,3	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13] Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
2058492	US9078181081	Union Pacific Corporation	North America	USA	14 May 2026	Annual	All For				2
2063826	US9120081099	US Foods Holding Corp.	North America	USA	14 May 2026	Annual	Against	1a 2	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10]Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8]Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
2060951	US98419M1009	Xylem Inc.	North America	USA	14 May 2026	Annual	All For				2
2064371	US9884981013	Yum! Brands, Inc.	North America	USA	14 May 2026	Annual	Against	4	Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]	1c	2
2049909	CA21037X1006	Constellation Software Inc.	North America	Canada	15 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.5 3	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] 2- Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently robust policy to prohibit the hedging of equity-based awards by executives together with strict controls over pledging of shares.[Remuneration11] 2- Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9] 3- Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] 4- Concerns that severance pay for a Named Executive Officer is inappropriately high with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS5]		1
2061974	US45866F1049	Intercontinental Exchange, Inc.	North America	USA	15 May 2026	Annual	Against	5	Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		2
2060169	US83444M1018	Solventum Corporation	North America	USA	15 May 2026	Annual	Against	1b	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5]		1
2066000	US1999081045	Comfort Systems USA, Inc.	North America	USA	18 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.10	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
2065825	US2091151041	Consolidated Edison, Inc.	North America	USA	18 May 2026	Annual	Against	1c,2 1k	Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]		1
2063300	US6200763075	Motorola Solutions, Inc.	North America	USA	18 May 2026	Annual	Against	1c	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing risks in its business and wider supply chain related to the respect of human rights which are relevant and material to business opportunity and risk and that changes in board composition would help improve governance and the effectiveness of management in pursuit of long-term value creation.[HumanRights1]	1e	1
2065200	US0311621009	Amgen Inc.	North America	USA	19 May 2026	Annual	Against	4	Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
2060666	US05722G1004	Baker Hughes Company	North America	USA	19 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.6 2	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8] Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
2049088	CA4436281022	HudBay Minerals Inc.	North America	Canada	19 May 2026	Annual/Special	Against	1E	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3]		1
2064562	US46625H1005	JPMorgan Chase & Co.	North America	USA	19 May 2026	Annual	Against	6 5	EOS manual override. Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]	1h	2
2064374	US5290434084	LXP Industrial Trust	North America	USA	19 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2064550	US59522J1034	Mid-America Apartment Communities, Inc.	North America	USA	19 May 2026	Annual	Against	1a,1d	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2065243	US70450Y1038	PayPal Holdings, Inc.	North America	USA	19 May 2026	Annual	Against	1k 3 6 5	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6] Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7]		1
2065855	US76169C1009	Rexford Industrial Realty, Inc.	North America	USA	19 May 2026	Annual	All For				2
2065175	US7766961061	Roper Technologies, Inc.	North America	USA	19 May 2026	Annual	All For				2
2059326	US8926721064	Tradeweb Markets Inc.	North America	USA	19 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.1 4	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2064259	US92345Y1064	Verisk Analytics, Inc.	North America	USA	19 May 2026	Annual	Against	1d	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
2065207	US9837931008	XPO, Inc.	North America	USA	19 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.2	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]		1
2061748	US0188021085	Alliant Energy Corporation	North America	USA	20 May 2026	Annual	Against	1d	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5]	1c	1
2064723	US02043Q1076	Alnylam Pharmaceuticals, Inc.	North America	USA	20 May 2026	Annual	Against	1c 2	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently robust policy to prohibit the hedging of equity-based awards by executives together with strict controls over pledging of shares.[Remuneration11]Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10]Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13]Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8]		1
2066170	US0231351067	Amazon.com, Inc.	North America	USA	20 May 2026	Annual	Against	7 5 1k 3 1h 1c	hareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6] hareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7] oncern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] oncerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] oncerns that the board is not appropriately managing risks in its business and wider supply chain related to the respect of human rights which are relevant and material to business opportunity and risk and that changes in board composition would help improve governance and the effectiveness of management in pursuit of long-term value creation.[HumanRights1] 2-Concerns related to board oversight and the necessary evaluation of the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time to determine the board fit for purpose [BoardEvaluationUS1] oncerns that the board is not appropriately managing risks in its business and wider supply chain related to the respect of human rights which are relevant and material to business opportunity and risk and that changes in board composition would help improve governance and the effectiveness of management in pursuit of long-term value creation.[HumanRights1] 2-Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5]		3
2065616	US03027X1000	American Tower Corporation	North America	USA	20 May 2026	Annual	All For				2
2064706	US0534841012	AvalonBay Communities, Inc.	North America	USA	20 May 2026	Annual	Against	1f	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		3
2067624	US09290D1019	BlackRock, Inc.	North America	USA	20 May 2026	Annual	Against	1d,1m,1p,2	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[BiodiversityUS1]		2
2063817	US1729674242	Citigroup Inc.	North America	USA	20 May 2026	Annual	Against	1f,3	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2064731	US22822V1017	Crown Castle Inc.	North America	USA	20 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2062904	US3379321074	FirstEnergy Corp.	North America	USA	20 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.3 1.5 4	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
2064252	US36828A1016	GE Vernova Inc.	North America	USA	20 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2065630	US44107P1049	Host Hotels & Resorts, Inc.	North America	USA	20 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.9 3	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8] Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
2064713	US45784P1012	Insulet Corporation	North America	USA	20 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.2 1.1 2	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8] Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1

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2063298	US5705351048	Markel Group Inc.	North America	USA	20 May 2026	Annual	Against	1b 6 5	Concern that the CEO has insufficient time to dedicate to their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6] Shareholder proposal would result in material additional disclosures that would be decision-useful to investors and would be an efficient use of company resources.[ShareholderProposal10]		1
2065244	US5801351017	McDonald's Corporation	North America	USA	20 May 2026	Annual	Against	1g 1j	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing risks in its business and wider supply chain related to the respect of human rights which are relevant and material to business opportunity and risk and that changes in board composition would help improve governance and the effectiveness of management in pursuit of long-term value creation.[HumanRights1]		2
2064377	US6092071058	Mondelez International, Inc.	North America	USA	20 May 2026	Annual	Against	5	Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
2071483	US6795801009	Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc.	North America	USA	20 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.8	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]		1
2064763	US74834L1008	Quest Diagnostics Incorporated	North America	USA	20 May 2026	Annual	Against	1j,4	Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		2
2063804	US7595091023	Reliance, Inc.	North America	USA	20 May 2026	Annual	Against	1g	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]		1
2064765	US7731211089	Rocket Lab Corporation	North America	USA	20 May 2026	Annual	Against	1a 3	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns related to board oversight and the necessary evaluation of the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time to determine the board fit for purpose [BoardEvaluationUS1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9]		1
2061721	US78409V1044	S&P Global Inc.	North America	USA	20 May 2026	Annual	Against	4	Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		2
2065833	US78467J1007	SS&C Technologies Holdings, Inc.	North America	USA	20 May 2026	Annual	Against	1b	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5]		1
2065834	US8574771031	State Street Corporation	North America	USA	20 May 2026	Annual	Against	4	Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
2066391	US4165151048	The Hartford Insurance Group, Inc.	North America	USA	20 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2064946	US89417E1091	The Travelers Companies, Inc.	North America	USA	20 May 2026	Annual	Against	1b 1c 4 6 5	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6] Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7]		2
2064963	US8835561023	Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc.	North America	USA	20 May 2026	Annual	Against	1e 1k,2	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing risks in its business and wider supply chain related to the respect of human rights which are relevant and material to business opportunity and risk and that changes in board composition would help improve governance and the effectiveness of management in pursuit of long-term value creation.[HumanRights1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
2067602	US8941641024	Travel + Leisure Co.	North America	USA	20 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2065245	US98389B1008	Xcel Energy Inc.	North America	USA	20 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2065646	US98978V1035	Zoetis Inc.	North America	USA	20 May 2026	Annual	All For			1c,2	1
2065618	US0320951017	Amphenol Corporation	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	3 1.3,1.5	Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of shares granted as part of the company's long-term incentive plan.[Remuneration12] 2- Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] 3- Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5]		2
2066536	US00182C1036	ANI Pharmaceuticals, Inc.	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	1f	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
2065836	US0937121079	Bloom Energy Corporation	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.4	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2067178	US1011211018	BXP, Inc.	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	1f	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
2067157	US12514G1085	CDW Corporation	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	4 5	Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2065173	US25862V1052	DoubleVerify Holdings, Inc.	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.1 2	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently robust policy to prohibit the hedging of equity-based awards by executives together with strict controls over pledging of shares.[Remuneration11] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8]		1
2067589	US26614N2018	DuPont de Nemours, Inc.	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	All For			1i,1,2	1
2067622	US2772761019	EastGroup Properties, Inc.	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	1b 1c	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
2063836	US3377381088	Fiserv, Inc.	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	4	Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
2066540	US4523271090	Illumina, Inc.	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	1E	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
2065829	US49177J1025	Kenvue Inc.	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	All For				2
2065509	US49446R1095	Kimco Realty Corporation	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2047935	US48251W1045	KKR & Co. Inc.	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Special	Against	2,3,4,5	Concerns that the proposal will introduce or perpetuate diminished minority shareholder rights.[ShareholderRights3]		2
2067433	US5049221055	Labcorp Holdings Inc.	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	1e 1g 2	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10]Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13]Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
2061757	US5717481023	Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc.	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	All For				2
2066563	US5763231090	MasTec, Inc.	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.2	Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]		1
2064282	US6081901042	Mohawk Industries, Inc.	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	1a 5	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Shareholder proposal seeks to protect and, where appropriate, advance shareholder rights on behalf of institutional investors.[ShareholderProposal9]		1
2062907	US65339F1012	NextEra Energy, Inc.	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	4 1d,1h,3	Shareholder proposal would result in material additional disclosures that would be decision-useful to investors and would be an efficient use of company resources.[ShareholderProposal10] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10]Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13]Concerns that severance pay for a Named Executive Officer is inappropriately high with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS5]		1
2066543	US69331C1080	PG&E Corporation	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	1f 1g 2	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8] Pay appears misaligned to value to shareholders, based on analysis of Total Shareholder Return performance and consideration of CEO pay relative to company peers.[RemunerationUS1] Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
2065832	US72352L1061	Pinterest, Inc.	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	1a	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2067020	US74762E1029	Quanta Services, Inc.	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	All For				2
2058498	US7561091049	Realty Income Corporation	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	1f 3	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8]		1
2064258	US7802871084	Royal Gold, Inc.	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	1b	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5]		1
2064762	US81762P1021	ServiceNow, Inc.	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	All For			1i	2
2064551	US8085131055	The Charles Schwab Corporation	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.2 3	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[BiodiversityUS1] Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6]Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8]		2



Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2065057	US4370761029	The Home Depot, Inc.	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	1b,1k 1c 9 10	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6] Shareholder proposal would result in material additional disclosures that would be decision-useful to investors and would be an efficient use of company resources.[ShareholderProposal10]		2
2063830	US9026531049	UDR, Inc.	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	1e 2	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2066312	US91529Y1064	Unum Group	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	1k	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
2067603	US92343E1029	VeriSign, Inc.	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.5 5	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
2064702	US92343V1044	Verizon Communications Inc.	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	6 5	Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6] Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7]		2
2066597	US9418481035	Waters Corporation	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.10 3	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13] Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
2061960	US94419L1017	Wayfair Inc.	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	Abstain Against	1f 1b 3,4	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] 2- Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] 3- Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2067091	US95040Q1040	Welltower Inc.	North America	USA	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	1h,3	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]	1c,1f	2
2063827	US03784Y2000	Apple Hospitality REIT, Inc.	North America	USA	22 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.8	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
2066554	US78410G1040	SBA Communications Corporation	North America	USA	22 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.2	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6]		1
2067639	US0200021014	The Allstate Corporation	North America	USA	22 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2069478	US30161Q1040	Exelixis, Inc.	North America	USA	26 May 2026	Annual	Against	1c	Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6]		1
2065844	US58933Y1055	Merck & Co., Inc.	North America	USA	26 May 2026	Annual	All For			1j,1m	2
2066593	US8962391004	Trimble Inc.	North America	USA	26 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.3 1.6	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2069477	US2521311074	DexCom, Inc.	North America	USA	27 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.3	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
2070103	US30303M1027	Meta Platforms, Inc.	North America	USA	27 May 2026	Annual	Against	3,7,8,9,11 4,5,6 1.5,1.6,1.11 1.1 1.8 1.7	hareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7] hareholder proposal seeks to protect and, where appropriate, advance shareholder rights on behalf of institutional investors.[ShareholderProposal9] oncern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] oncerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] 2-Concern that the Chair and CEO role are combined, which can lead to a lack of independent oversight of management, particularly when insufficiently balanced by the presence of a Lead Independent Director with adequate powers to ensure the board may act independently of the Chair in certain circumstances.[IndividualDirector2] 3-Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] 4-Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] oncerns related to the chair not being fully independent of the company, which in our view may at times compromise the ability to oversee the executives of the company in the interests of minority shareholders.[BoardStructure4] oncerns that the board is not appropriately managing risks in its business and widersupply chain related to the respect of human rights which are relevant and material to business opportunity and risk and that changes in board composition would help improve governance and the effectiveness of management in pursuit of long-term value creation.[HumanRights1]		2
2069482	US64125C1099	Neurocrine Biosciences, Inc.	North America	USA	27 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.3	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5]		2
2070927	US68902V1070	Otis Worldwide Corporation	North America	USA	27 May 2026	Annual	Against	4	Shareholder proposal would result in material additional disclosures that would be decision-useful to investors and would be an efficient use of company resources.[ShareholderProposal10]		1
2070104	US88033G4073	Tenet Healthcare Corporation	North America	USA	27 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.11	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]	1.2,2	1
2056485	CA0115321089	Alamos Gold Inc.	North America	Canada	28 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.3 1.4	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1

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2070101	US05464C1018	Axon Enterprise, Inc.	North America	USA	28 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2067608	US3665051054	Garrett Motion Inc.	North America	USA	28 May 2026	Annual	Against	1b	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
2069480	US3666511072	Gartner, Inc.	North America	USA	28 May 2026	Annual	Against	1f	Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6]		2
2070080	US7710491033	Roblox Corporation	North America	USA	28 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.2 2	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2070108	US79466L3024	Salesforce, Inc.	North America	USA	28 May 2026	Annual	Against	1j 5 2	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		3
2070431	US95082P1057	WESCO International, Inc.	North America	USA	28 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2070075	US0404132054	Arista Networks, Inc.	North America	USA	29 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.3	oncerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] 2-Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders. 3-[Remuneration5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]	2	2
2070898	US2538681030	Digital Realty Trust, Inc.	North America	USA	29 May 2026	Annual	All For				2
2069861	US5486611073	Lowe's Companies, Inc.	North America	USA	29 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.1,1.2 4 5	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6] Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7]		1
2069483	US67079K1007	NuScale Power Corporation	North America	USA	29 May 2026	Annual	Against	1.4 1.9	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2070949	US84265V1052	Southern Copper Corporation	North America	USA	29 May 2026	Annual	Against	1a,1c,1d 1f	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureUS3] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6]		1
2053654	CA00762V1094	Aecon Group Inc.	North America	Canada	01 June 2026	Annual	Against	1a	Concerns related to overall board diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL4]		1
2072494	US91324P1021	UnitedHealth Group, Inc.	North America	USA	01 June 2026	Annual	Against	1e 1a,4	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]	1b	2
2072445	US09857L1089	Booking Holdings Inc.	North America	USA	02 June 2026	Annual	Against	1f 1e 5	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] 2- Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing risks in its business and wider supply chain related to the respect of human rights which are relevant and material to business opportunity and risk and that changes in board composition would help improve governance and the effectiveness of management in pursuit of long-term value creation.[HumanRights1] Shareholder proposal would result in material additional disclosures that would be decision-useful to investors and would be an efficient use of company resources.[ShareholderProposal10]		2
2070543	US1924461023	Cognizant Technology Solutions Corporation	North America	USA	02 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2071802	US23834J2015	Dave, Inc.	North America	USA	02 June 2026	Annual	Against	1a 2	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9]		1
2071798	US37045V1008	General Motors Company	North America	USA	02 June 2026	Annual	Against	1k 5 6 7	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes, and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6] Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7]		2
2073305	US7707001027	Robinhood Markets, Inc.	North America	USA	02 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.7	Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2071788	US0028962076	Abercrombie & Fitch Co.	North America	USA	03 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2074182	US03676B1026	Antero Midstream Corporation	North America	USA	03 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.2,1.3	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]		1
2072137	US03831W1080	AppLovin Corporation	North America	USA	03 June 2026	Annual	Against	1b,1d,3,4,5	Shareholder proposal seeks to protect and, where appropriate, advance shareholder rights on behalf of institutional investors.[ShareholderProposal9]		2

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2070922	US04316A1088	Artisan Partners Asset Management Inc.	North America	USA	03 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.2	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
2074460	US3802371076	GoDaddy Inc.	North America	USA	03 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2072420	US02156V1098	Oklo Inc.	North America	USA	03 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.2	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2074574	US69608A1088	Palantir Technologies Inc.	North America	USA	03 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.4,3,5,6	Shareholder proposal would result in material additional disclosures that would be decision-useful to investors and would be an efficient use of company resources.[ShareholderProposal10]		2
2051333	CA76131D1033	Restaurant Brands International Inc.	North America	Canada	03 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.1 2	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently robust policy to prohibit the hedging of equity-based awards by executives together with strict controls over pledging of shares.[Remuneration11] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8]		1
2074923	US91823B1098	UWM Holdings Corporation	North America	USA	03 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.4 1.1 1.2 3	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructureUS2] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureUS3] Concern that the Chair and CEO role are combined, which can lead to a lack of independent oversight of management, particularly when insufficiently balanced by the presence of a Lead Independent Director with adequate powers to ensure the board may act independently of the Chair in certain circumstances.[IndividualDirector2] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9]		1
2073259	US0844231029	W. R. Berkley Corporation	North America	USA	03 June 2026	Annual	Against	1b	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6]		2
2063966	CA09950M3003	Boralex Inc.	North America	Canada	04 June 2026	Annual/Special	All For				1
2072129	US29084Q1004	EMCOR Group, Inc.	North America	USA	04 June 2026	Annual	All For			1a,2	1
2070113	US64110L1061	Netflix, Inc.	North America	USA	04 June 2026	Annual	Against	1f,1g 1a	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		2
2074269	US75700L1089	Red Rock Resorts, Inc.	North America	USA	04 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.3 1.5 1.4 2	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2075288	US78781J1097	SailPoint, Inc.	North America	USA	04 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.1	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureUS3] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructureUS2] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2074320	US9311421039	Walmart Inc.	North America	USA	04 June 2026	Annual	Against	1j 6,7,8	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3] Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7]		1
2074689	US0090661010	Airbnb, Inc.	North America	USA	05 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.2 3 1.3 7 6	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] 2- Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] 3- Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] 4- Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] 2- Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the use of share options.[RemunerationGL2] 3- Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing risks in its business and wider supply chain related to the respect of human rights which are relevant and material to business opportunity and risk and that changes in board composition would help improve governance and the effectiveness of management in pursuit of long-term value creation.[HumanRights1] Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7] 2- Shareholder proposal would result in material additional disclosures that would be decision-useful to investors and would be an efficient use of company resources.[ShareholderProposal10] Shareholder proposal seeks to protect and, where appropriate, advance shareholder rights on behalf of institutional investors.[ShareholderProposal9]		1
2075272	US02079K3059	Alphabet Inc.	North America	USA	05 June 2026	Annual	Against	1g,1i 11,12 6,13,14 1j,3,4,7	EOS manual override. Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7] Shareholder proposal would result in material additional disclosures that would be decision-useful to investors and would be an efficient use of company resources.[ShareholderProposal10] Shareholder proposal seeks to protect and, where appropriate, advance shareholder rights on behalf of institutional investors.[ShareholderProposal9]	1d,1h,5	2

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2075320	US03769M1062	Apollo Global Management, Inc.	North America	USA	08 June 2026	Annual	Against	3 1.4 1.1 2	Annual votes allow shareholders to express their views every year, keeping boards and committees accountable for their decisions.[Miscellaneous1] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2073223	US21873S1087	CoreWeave, Inc.	North America	USA	08 June 2026	Annual	Against	3	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9]		1
2077668	US45337C1027	Incyte Corporation	North America	USA	08 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.1 1.2 2	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13]		2
2077619	US5949724083	Strategy Inc	North America	USA	08 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.7 4 3	Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns related to board oversight and the necessary evaluation of the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time to determine the board fit for purpose [BoardEvaluationUS1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9]		1
2077647	US09062X1037	Biogen Inc.	North America	USA	09 June 2026	Annual	Against	1h	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
2057124	US12572Q1058	CME Group Inc.	North America	USA	09 June 2026	Annual	Against	1i 1k 1d,3	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] 2- Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]		2
2063777	CA4488112083	Hydro One Limited	North America	Canada	09 June 2026	Annual	Against	1H	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3]		1
2073618	US53566V1061	Lineage, Inc.	North America	USA	09 June 2026	Annual	Against	1b 1a 1g 3	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureUS3] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns relating to the attendance of a director, which appears to be lower than 75% of the relevant board and committee meetings expected annually without clear justification of their absence.[BoardStructure2] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2074238	US58733R1023	MercadoLibre, Inc.	North America	USA	09 June 2026	Annual	Against	1b 2	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureUS3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9]		1
2080641	US8725401090	The TJX Companies, Inc.	North America	USA	09 June 2026	Annual	All For				2
2072721	US90384S3031	Ulta Beauty, Inc.	North America	USA	09 June 2026	Annual	Against	1h 5	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13]Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8]Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
2080317	US9344231041	Warner Bros. Discovery, Inc.	North America	USA	09 June 2026	Annual	Against	3 1.3,1.5,1.9	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to a perceived lack of response to relatively low shareholder support on remuneration-related proposals.[Remuneration9] 2- Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the recent use of one-time awards with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[Remuneration7] 3- Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7] 4- Concerns that severance pay for a Named Executive Officer is inappropriately high with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS5] 5- Pay appears misaligned to value to shareholders, based on analysis of Total Shareholder Return performance and consideration of CEO pay relative to company peers.[RemunerationUS1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5]		1
2080766	US0357108390	Annaly Capital Management, Inc.	North America	USA	10 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2080705	US1491231015	Caterpillar, Inc.	North America	USA	10 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.6,2 1.2	Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]	1.7	1
2075385	US20030N1019	Comcast Corporation	North America	USA	10 June 2026	Annual	Against	3 1.1,1.2,1.5,4	Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8]. Pay appears misaligned to value to shareholders, based on analysis of Total Shareholder Return performance and consideration of CEO pay relative to company peers.[RemunerationUS1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		2

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2071781	US25809K1051	DoorDash, Inc.	North America	USA	10 June 2026	Annual	Against	1c 3	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] 2- Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] 3- Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] 4- Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of shares granted as part of the company's long-term incentive plan.[Remuneration12] 2- Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] 3- Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9]		1
2077736	US31620M1062	Fidelity National Information Services, Inc.	North America	USA	10 June 2026	Annual	Against	1h 2	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
2074158	US35671D8570	Freeport-McMoRan, Inc.	North America	USA	10 June 2026	Annual	Against	1k	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing risks in its business and wider supply chain related to the respect of human rights which are relevant and material to business opportunity and risk and that changes in board composition would help improve governance and the effectiveness of management in pursuit of long-term value creation.[HumanRights1]	1f	1
2075349	US6311031081	Nasdaq, Inc.	North America	USA	10 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2079747	US77311W1018	Rocket Companies, Inc.	North America	USA	10 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.2	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructureUS2] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureUS3] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5]		1
2076321	US87612E1064	Target Corporation	North America	USA	10 June 2026	Annual	Against	1b,1e,1i,5,6	Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7]	1i,2	2
2048491	CA8849038812	Thomson Reuters Corporation	North America	Canada	10 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.7 4	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureUS3] Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7]		1
2079671	US9282541013	Virtu Financial, Inc.	North America	USA	10 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.3 1.2 2	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureUS3] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9]		1
2077200	US1696561059	Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.	North America	USA	11 June 2026	Annual	All For				2
2055901	CA25675T1075	Dollarama Inc.	North America	Canada	11 June 2026	Annual	Against	7 6	Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7] Shareholder proposal seeks to protect and, where appropriate, advance shareholder rights on behalf of institutional investors.[ShareholderProposal9]		1
2075314	US45687V1061	Ingersoll Rand Inc.	North America	USA	11 June 2026	Annual	All For			1j,3	1
2074261	US6323071042	Natera, Inc.	North America	USA	11 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.3 1.1 5	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2066338	CA62930A1021	NGEx Minerals Ltd.	North America	Canada	11 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.2 1.4	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to overall board diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL4]		1
2080744	US98980L1017	Zoom Communications, Inc.	North America	USA	11 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.2	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureUS3] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2080883	US0865161014	Best Buy Co., Inc.	North America	USA	12 June 2026	Annual	Against	1m	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		2
2078487	US34959E1091	Fortinet, Inc.	North America	USA	12 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.3,1.4 1.7 3	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9]		3
2075278	US75886F1075	Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc.	North America	USA	12 June 2026	Annual	Against	1a	Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		2
2074737	US1564311082	Century Aluminum Company	North America	USA	15 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.7 1.2	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]		1
2078998	US23804L1035	Datadog, Inc.	North America	USA	15 June 2026	Annual	Against	1b,1c,2,4	Shareholder proposal seeks to protect and, where appropriate, advance shareholder rights on behalf of institutional investors.[ShareholderProposal9]		1
2075335	US25402D1028	DigitalOcean Holdings, Inc.	North America	USA	15 June 2026	Annual	Against	1a	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2075273	US8522341036	Block, Inc.	North America	USA	16 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.2	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2075249	US19260Q1076	Coinbase Global, Inc.	North America	USA	16 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.7 1.8	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureUS3] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		2
2080786	US46222L1089	IonQ, Inc.	North America	USA	16 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.1 3	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2075348	US49271V1008	Keurig Dr Pepper Inc.	North America	USA	16 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2076317	US57636Q1040	Mastercard Incorporated	North America	USA	16 June 2026	Annual	Against	1d	oncern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]	1a,1e,1f	2
2079649	US59156R1086	MetLife, Inc.	North America	USA	16 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2057169	CA82509L1076	Shopify Inc.	North America	Canada	16 June 2026	Annual	Against	1B 3 1D 4	Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to a perceived lack of response to relatively low shareholder support on remuneration-related proposals.[Remuneration9] 2- Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of shares granted as part of the company's long-term incentive plan.[Remuneration12] 3- Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationGL8] 4- Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the significant use of qualitative metrics.[RemunerationGL3] 5- Concerns that severance pay for a Named Executive Officer is inappropriately high with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS5] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Shareholder proposal promotes actions that should help achieve long-term value creation while safeguarding shareholder interests.[ShareholderProposal8]		2
2076283	US8725901040	T-Mobile US, Inc.	North America	USA	16 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.5 1.13 1.2 3	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructureUS2] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureUS3] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2077644	US90138F1021	Twilio Inc.	North America	USA	16 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.4 1.2 4	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2082076	US98138H1014	Workday, Inc.	North America	USA	16 June 2026	Annual	Against	1a 1d 3,4,5 6 7	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureUS3] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns relating to the attendance of a director, which appears to be lower than 75% of the relevant board and committee meetings expected annually without clear justification of their absence.[BoardStructure2] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7] Shareholder proposal seeks to protect and, where appropriate, advance shareholder rights on behalf of institutional investors.[ShareholderProposal9]		1
2082413	US0527691069	Autodesk, Inc.	North America	USA	17 June 2026	Annual	Against	1e 1b,1h,5	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		2
2082048	US22788C1053	CrowdStrike Holdings, Inc.	North America	USA	17 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.2 4	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		2
2080725	US2786421030	eBay Inc.	North America	USA	17 June 2026	Annual	Against	4	Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
2077681	US40131M1099	Guardant Health, Inc.	North America	USA	17 June 2026	Annual	Against	1a	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
2081584	US9224751084	Veeva Systems Inc.	North America	USA	17 June 2026	Annual	Against	1d 1g	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureUS3] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5]	1h	1

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2074620	US92537N1081	Vertiv Holdings Co.	North America	USA	17 June 2026	Annual	Against	1d 1e 2 1a	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that compensation for certain non-executive directors is inappropriately high relative to performance with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of a lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[Remuneration4] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9]Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10]Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of shares granted as part of the company's long-term incentive plan.[Remuneration12]Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13]Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		2
2075310	US15643U1043	Centrus Energy Corp.	North America	USA	18 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.3	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2075313	US2473617023	Delta Air Lines, Inc.	North America	USA	18 June 2026	Annual	Against	1b,1d	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
2068802	US29476L1070	Equity Residential	North America	USA	18 June 2026	Annual	All For				2
2057186	CA46579R1047	Ivanhoe Mines Ltd.	North America	Canada	18 June 2026	Annual/Special	Against	2A,2B 2D 4	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
2082799	US6792951054	Oktá, Inc.	North America	USA	18 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.1 3,4	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
2082327	US9699041011	Williams-Sonoma, Inc.	North America	USA	18 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.7 1.4 2	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9]Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10]Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8]Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
2076345	US76954A1034	Rivian Automotive, Inc.	North America	USA	22 June 2026	Annual	Against	1a,3	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9]Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2084338	US1431301027	CarMax, Inc.	North America	USA	23 June 2026	Annual	Against	1d 1k	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
2082670	US21874C1027	Core & Main, Inc.	North America	USA	23 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.2	Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]		1
2080791	US22160N1090	CoStar Group, Inc.	North America	USA	23 June 2026	Annual	Against	1h 3	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13]Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS6]Pay appears misaligned to value to shareholders, based on analysis of Total Shareholder Return performance and consideration of CEO pay relative to company peers.[RemunerationUS1]Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
2057059	CA2849025093	Eldorado Gold Corporation	North America	Canada	23 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2063787	CA2926717083	Energy Fuels Inc.	North America	Canada	24 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.6 1.2 1.3 3	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9]		1
2084342	US67066G1040	NVIDIA Corporation	North America	USA	24 June 2026	Annual	Against	1d,2,4	Shareholder proposal seeks to protect and, where appropriate, advance shareholder rights on behalf of institutional investors.[ShareholderProposal9]	1g	2
2079638	US87165B1035	Synchrony Financial	North America	USA	24 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2084746	US42226A1079	HealthEquity, Inc.	North America	USA	25 June 2026	Annual	All For				1
2086546	US5500211090	lululemon athletica inc.	North America	USA	25 June 2026	Annual	Against	1c 3	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2084739	US5738741041	Marvell Technology, Inc.	North America	USA	25 June 2026	Annual	Against	1b 2 4	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		2
2084741	US81730H1095	SentinelOne, Inc.	North America	USA	25 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.2 3	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to a perceived lack of response to relatively low shareholder support on remuneration-related proposals.[Remuneration9]Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2079258	CA16890P1036	China Gold International Resources Corp. Ltd.	North America	Canada	29 June 2026	Annual/Special	Against	2.6 7 4,6	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds) [BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
2066334	CA2960061091	Ero Copper Corp.	North America	Canada	29 June 2026	Annual/Special	Against	1.7 4	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2086078	US8334451098	Snowflake Inc.	North America	USA	29 June 2026	Annual	Against	1a 2 1b 4	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureUS3] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to a perceived lack of response to relatively low shareholder support on remuneration-related proposals.[Remuneration9] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Shareholder proposal seeks to protect and, where appropriate, advance shareholder rights on behalf of institutional investors.[ShareholderProposal9]		2
2095587	US18915M1071	Cloudflare, Inc.	North America	USA	30 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.3 7 4A,4B,4C,4D,4E,4F 1.2 6 3,5	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2086542	US60937P1066	MongoDB, Inc.	North America	USA	30 June 2026	Annual	Against	1.2	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5]		1
2069848	CA65340P1062	NexGen Energy Ltd.	North America	Canada	30 June 2026	Annual/Special	Against	2.5,2.8 2.3	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5]		1
2044378	GB0009895292	AstraZeneca PLC	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	09 April 2026	Annual	Against	6	Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.	5m	1
2052091	JE00BYPZJM29	Janus Henderson Group Plc	United Kingdom	Jersey	16 April 2026	Extraordinary Shareholders	All For				1
2049826	GB00BP9LHF23	Schroders Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	16 April 2026	Annual	Against	5	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3]		1
2040854	GB00BP9LHF23	Schroders Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	16 April 2026	Court	All For				1
2040858	GB00BP9LHF23	Schroders Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	16 April 2026	Special	All For				1
2055121	GB00BYQ0JC66	Beazley Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	22 April 2026	Annual	Against	18 3	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUK7]		1
2059025	GB00BYQ0JC66	Beazley Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	22 April 2026	Court	All For				1
2059036	GB00BYQ0JC66	Beazley Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	22 April 2026	Special	All For				1
2044225	GB00BJFFLV09	Croda International Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	22 April 2026	Annual	All For				1
2054963	GB00B0SWJX34	London Stock Exchange Group Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	23 April 2026	Annual	All For				3
2041089	GB00B2B0DG97	RELX Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	23 April 2026	Annual	Against	3	Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUK7]	2	3

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2052864	GB00B2B0DG97	RELX Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	23 April 2026	Annual	Against	3	Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUK7]	2	1
2053533	GB00B5ZN1N88	SEGRO PLC	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	23 April 2026	Annual	All For				3
2041277	GB00BM8PJY71	NatWest Group Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	28 April 2026	Annual	All For				1
2048784	GB0008782301	Taylor Wimpey Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	28 April 2026	Annual	Against	6 2,3	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUK9]		1
2048764	GB00B02J6398	Admiral Group Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	29 April 2026	Annual	All For				2
2031707	GB00BTK05J60	Anglo American Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	29 April 2026	Annual	Against	15	Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUK7]	3,17	1
2054675	JE00BTDN8H13	Aptiv Plc	United Kingdom	Jersey	29 April 2026	Annual	All For				2
2045473	GB00BMX86B70	Haleon Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	29 April 2026	Annual	All For				1
2057068	GB00BNGDN821	Melrose Industries Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	29 April 2026	Annual	All For				1
2058822	GB00BRJQ&J25	Hammerson Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	30 April 2026	Annual	Against	9 10 3	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to board composition as indicated by failure to meet targets set out in UK FCA listing rules on diversity and inclusion Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUK9]		1
2056975	GB0006825383	Persimmon Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	30 April 2026	Annual	Against	3,4	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUK9]		1
2053551	GB0006776081	Pearson Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	01 May 2026	Annual	Against	16 15	Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUK7] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2043738	GB00BRXH2664	Anglogold Ashanti Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	05 May 2026	Annual	All For				2
2048779	GB00BPQY8M80	Aviva Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	06 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2048975	GB00BN7SWP63	GSK Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	06 May 2026	Annual	All For			2	1
2042860	GB0007188757	Rio Tinto Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	06 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2054575	GB0009223206	Smith & Nephew plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	06 May 2026	Annual	Against	16 21 3 2	Concerns related to board composition as indicated by failure to meet targets set out in UK FCA listing rules on diversity and inclusion Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUK7] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the use of more than two types of concurrent variable pay arrangements.[RemunerationUK6] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUK7] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the use of time-based restricted shares.[RemunerationUK1]		1
2058546	GB0000456144	Antofagasta Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	07 May 2026	Annual	Against	2	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the total shareholder returns (TSR) vesting for below median performance.[RemunerationUK4] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUK9]	5	1
2039639	GB0031348658	Barclays PLC	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	07 May 2026	Annual	All For			2	3
2042865	GB00B033F229	Centrica Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	07 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2045568	GB0005576813	Howden Joinery Group Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	07 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2048786	GB00B082RF11	Rentokil Initial Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	07 May 2026	Annual	Against	4 17,18	Concerns related to board composition as indicated by failure to meet targets set out in UK FCA listing rules on diversity and inclusion Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the use of share options.[RemunerationUK2]		1
2044215	GB0004082847	Standard Chartered Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	07 May 2026	Annual	All For			3,24	1
2065072	GB00BG49KP99	Tritax Big Box REIT plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	07 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2045498	GB0005405286	HSBC Holdings Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	08 May 2026	Annual	All For			2	2
2067841	GB00B63QSB39	Greggs Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	13 May 2026	Annual	Against	13	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUK9]		1
2052731	GB00B135BJ46	Savills Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	13 May 2026	Annual	Against	4 2	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationGL7]		1
2065428	GB00BWFGQN14	Spirax Group Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	13 May 2026	Annual	Against	2	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUK9]		1
2052954	GB00BVZK7T90	Unilever Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	13 May 2026	Annual	Against	3	Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUK7]	2,7	1
2048109	GB0001859296	Vistry Group Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	13 May 2026	Annual	Abstain Against	5 2 4 3	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationGL8] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the use of time-based restricted shares.[RemunerationUK1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the use of time-based restricted shares.[RemunerationUK1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationGL8]		1
2037477	GB0008706128	Lloyds Banking Group Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	14 May 2026	Annual	All For			12	1
2044775	GB00B62G9D36	Shaftesbury Capital Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	14 May 2026	Annual	Abstain	10			1

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2056382	GB00BGXQNP29	Standard Life Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	14 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2044219	GB0006928617	The UNITE Group Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	15 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2047674	GB0031638363	Intertek Group Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	20 May 2026	Annual	Against	2	Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationGL7]		1
2054850	GB00B39GTJ17	Science Group Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	20 May 2026	Annual	Against	5 1,12 11	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concern that the Chair and CEO role are combined, which can lead to a lack of independent oversight of management, particularly when insufficiently balanced by the presence of a Lead Independent Director with adequate powers to ensure the board may act independently of the Chair in certain circumstances.[IndividualDirector2] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
2049902	GB00BL6K5J42	Endeavour Mining Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	6	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
2014392	GB0005603997	Legal & General Group Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	21 May 2026	Annual	All For				1
2051669	GB0005603997	Legal & General Group Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	21 May 2026	Special	All For				1
2058645	GB0032089863	Next Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	2 3	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationGL8] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the overreliance on total shareholder returns (TSR).[RemunerationGL5]		2
2058252	GB00BSZBP530	Reckitt Benckiser Group Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	21 May 2026	Annual	Against	2	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the use of share options. Concerns that compensation for CEO is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds		1
2042631	JE00B4T3BW64	Glencore Plc	United Kingdom	Jersey	28 May 2026	Annual	Against	13	Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[Remuneration2]		2
2034766	GB0007099541	Prudential Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	28 May 2026	Annual	Against	7,9,10,11 2,3	Concerns related to board composition as indicated by failure to meet targets set out in UK FCA listing rules on diversity and inclusion.[BoardCompositionGL5] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationGL7]		2
2070586	JE00BYPZJM29	Janus Henderson Group Plc	United Kingdom	Jersey	29 May 2026	Annual	Against	1,8 3 1,10,2	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7] Pay appears misaligned to value to shareholders, based on analysis of Total Shareholder Return performance and consideration of CEO pay relative to company peers.[RemunerationUS1] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8] EOS Manual Override.		1
2067609	GB00BMVP7Y09	Royalty Pharma Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	04 June 2026	Annual	Against	1b,1d	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]		1
2079848	GB00BMJ6DW54	Informa Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	18 June 2026	Annual	All For				2
2087837	GB00BKDTK925	Trainline Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	18 June 2026	Annual	Against	2	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationGL9]		1
2089598	GB00BMHVL512	Klarna Group Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	22 June 2026	Annual	Against	7 2 3 11,12	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the use of share options.[RemunerationGL2] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the use of time-based restricted shares.[RemunerationGL1] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2089315	GB00B1YW4409	3i Group PLC	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	25 June 2026	Annual	Against	2,3	Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationGL7]		2
1973154	GG00BMG42V42	Super Group (SGHC) Limited	United Kingdom	Guernsey	25 June 2026	Annual	Against	1e 5	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1